

# Aspirations and Inequality: Peer Effects in Education<sup>\*†</sup>

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March 13, 2024

## Abstract

We study the long-run effects of income inequality within peer compositions in schools. We propose a theoretical framework based on reference dependence where inequality in peer groups can generate aspiration gaps. Guided by predictions from this framework we find that an increase in the share of low-income peers within school-cohorts improves the educational outcomes of low-income students and negatively affects high-income students. We then find that better connections in the school network has an important role in mitigating these effects. Our results point to the role of inequality among peers, while also demonstrating potential to avoid these consequences.

*Keywords:* Peer Effects, Education, Inequality, Reference Dependence

*JEL-Codes:* I21, I24, I29, J24

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†This paper previously appeared under a different title as IZA Discussion Paper No. 15785: “Reference Dependent Aspirations and Peer Effects in Education.” This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies and foundations. Information on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on the Add Health website (<http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth>). No direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis. Fongoni acknowledges funding from the French government under the “France 2030” investment plan managed by the French National Research Agency (reference: ANR-17-EURE-0020) and from Excellence Initiative of Aix-Marseille University - A\*MIDEX.

# 1 Introduction

The effects of exposure to income inequality are less clear than are sources of inequality. It is well known that family income and socio-economic standing (SES) are linked with disparities in children’s skill development (Doepke et al., 2019; Falk et al., 2021). Some of these disparities are driven by differences in the quality of environments in which children grow up (Chetty and Hendren, 2018a,b). One policy response has been to relocate children from worse off backgrounds into better environments so they can benefit from improved resources, opportunities, and information. However, existing examples suggest mixed results. For instance, in the Moving to Opportunity experiment adolescent movers experienced on average null or even negative effects (Chetty et al., 2016), while the integration of poor students into elite schools in Delhi improved some pro-social outcomes among existing students but appears to have harmed performance (Rao, 2019). Such interventions involve exposing students to a different distribution of income both for the lower- and higher-income students. Yet, we know less about how exposure to income inequality can affect behavior and what can be done to mitigate any unintended consequences. In this paper, we make three contributions by (i) framing a behavioral theory based on socially determined aspirations that can explain heterogeneous consequences from exposure to inequality; (ii) empirically testing our predictions through shifts in the share of low-income peers heterogeneous to students’ family income; and (iii) highlighting a path through social capital that could mitigate these consequences.

**Theoretical framing.** Our first contribution is to formalize a novel behavioral response that can generate unintended consequences on students’ effort when changing their environment. Our theory builds on the literature of socially determined aspirations (Genicot and Ray, 2020) and is partly motivated by the fact that students’ aspirations for education – their goals and what they think of as success – form in a social environment (Guyon and Huillery, 2021; Carlana et al., 2022a). Exposure to inequality then has the potential to create frustration and disheartenment through adjusting the reference point for success.<sup>1</sup>

We consider students who have different capacities for translating effort into an educational outcome and then build on the idea of aspirations gaps: differences between achievable outcomes and aspirations (see, e.g. Genicot and Ray, 2017). Students have a reference point for educational success, their aspiration point, that depends on their own-capacity and, importantly, on the capacity of their peers. Central to our theory is

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<sup>1</sup>As an anecdotal example, consider a story told by the “This American Life” radio program about a group of high school students attending school in one of America’s poorest congressional districts taken to visit a nearby elite private school (Episode 550: Three Miles available at <https://www.thisamericanlife.org/550/three-miles>). Their reactions, described by a teacher, tell a powerful story (Greenbaum, 2015). “They felt like everyone was looking at them. And one of the students started screaming and crying. Like, this is unfair. This is – I don’t want to be here. I’m leaving.”

a dual nature of aspirations. When aspirations are exceeded, an increase in aspirations will motivate students to increase effort, but when aspirations are not attainable, an increase in aspirations will further demoralize students, who will reduce effort. Lower capacity students then fall behind this aspirations reference point in a high-capacity peer environment yielding frustration and a lower effort. Higher capacity students fall above and experience positive effects on effort from greater motivation to be ahead. Furthermore, students in the middle of the capacity distribution are arrayed more closely around their aspirations reference point, balancing positive and negative effects from shifts in the peer distribution to a weaker, or null, effort response on average.

By considering aspirations to be socially determined, our model identifies a novel behavioral channel by which exposure to inequality can have non-linear effects across students. We think of adolescents' family income as effectively capturing capacity. We base this on evidence that SES is positively related to skill trajectories over childhood (Doepke et al., 2019; Falk et al., 2021) and evidence that the conditions of poverty tax mental bandwidth (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Lichand and Mani, 2020; Mani et al., 2013). Our concept of capacity allows, for instance, that a student with the raw ability to achieve higher education may still have a low capacity due to facing severe stressors at home. Thus, the distribution of capacities in the social environment captures not only inequality in ability but also important dimensions such as inequality in noncognitive skills, in opportunities, and in cognitive load. Hence, we derive a set of new predictions on the impact of exposure to income inequality on educational outcomes, which is what we exploit in our empirical analysis. In Section 3.1 we discuss the income-capacity link in more detail and provide empirical evidence for it.

**Empirical analysis.** Our second contribution is to empirically test these predictions on long-run educational attainment through changes in the income composition of peers. We interpret the distribution of peer income as a salient indicator of inequality and our theory suggests that effects should be non-linear across students' positions in the income distribution. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health), we test the effect of the leave-one-out share of low-income peers in a school cohort on university completion across the distribution of students' family income. We use a within school, across cohort design and effectively compare students in the same school, who have similar family incomes and characteristics, but who face differences in the share of low-income peers across their cohorts. The key assumptions are that unobserved selection factors into schools are fixed at the school level and that our flexible own-income controls fully capture the link between students' family income and their outcome, avoiding contamination of our treatment effect which is split across students' position in the income distribution. We discuss in detail our identification strategy and assumptions in Section 3.2.

Our main results match the key predictions of the theory. Among students in the bottom 20th percentile of the income distribution (low-capacity), a standard deviation increase of 20% in the share of low-income peers *raises* the propensity to complete university by 3.6pp. For this same change, students in the top 20th percentile of income (high-capacity) experience a *decrease* in university completion by 4.1pp. Middle income students have estimated *null* effects. The estimated effects for low- and high-income students are sizable and are comparable to the effects of financial assistance of about \$1,000 in Pell Grants, an intervention aimed at fostering human capital investment by offering means-tested financial assistance to high-school students. Further, we confirm these results are robust to a wide range of checks. These findings lend strong support to our predictions on the non-linear effects of socially determined aspirations, however, they do not provide a direct test of the proposed mechanism.

We attempt to overcome this by turning to evidence on short-run measures that could relate to the aspirations-effort relationship established by our theory. Specifically, we look at measures of high school performance, self-efficacy and mental health (which we interpret as proxies for effort and motivation), as well as students' self-reported expectations and desires to go to college (which we see as respectively capturing beliefs about capacity and aspirations).<sup>2</sup> Overall, we find these results to be consistent with the predictions of our model: low-income students improve in their performance and motivation, while estimates are insignificant for middle-income, and negative but weaker for high-income students. The signs of the point estimates on students' beliefs are also consistent, but the effects are small and insignificant. In terms of students' desires, if anything the results suggest that aspirations decrease in response to our peer treatment, consistent with a key premise of our theory. Nevertheless, as we explain in detail in Section 4.2, we remain cautious in the interpretation of these results due to the well-known issue of identifying aspirations empirically (see also the discussion in Genicot and Ray (2020)).

To further corroborate our baseline empirical results on long-run educational outcomes, in Section 4.3 we also explore evidence on potential alternative mechanisms that have been put forward in the literature, and that could interact with our peer treatment. Specifically, we investigate peer ability and rank effects (Booij et al., 2017; Feld and Zölitz, 2017), teachers responses to classroom composition (Aucejo et al., 2022; Duflo et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2014; Jackson, 2016; Papageorge et al., 2020), changes in disruptive behavior (Carrell and Hoekstra, 2010; Carrell et al., 2018; Kristoffersen et al., 2015; Zhao and Zhao, 2021; Billings and Hoekstra, 2023), and in parental involvement (Greaves et al., 2023; Fredriksson et al., 2016). We do not find any evidence that these

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<sup>2</sup>This distinction draws on the fundamental difference between what an individual realistically expects to achieve (expectations), and what they wish to achieve (aspirations) (see, e.g. Guyon and Huillery, 2021; Genicot and Ray, 2020).

potential mechanisms either interact or affect our main results, further corroborating our proposed mechanism based on socially determined aspiration gaps.

**Avoiding the effects of income inequality.** Finally, our third contribution is to highlight a path toward mitigating the consequences of exposing students to income inequality. In the literature, it has been widely observed that non-linear peer ability effects can suggest ability tracking to be optimal for student effort (Booij et al., 2017; Feld and Zölitz, 2017). However, our concept of capacity suggests that ability tracking may not be successful in resolving the consequences from adjusting peer income compositions that we document. Put differently, it may not be possible to track on all the dimensions that family income captures and that are salient to students. Consistent with this suggestion we show, in Section 4.3, that our estimated effects are not driven by ability ranks or non-linear peer ability effects.

What then can improve the ability of schools to support disadvantaged students faced with inequality? We suggest this may lie in the ability to reduce the weight students put on peer distributions when forming reference points. Our theory is about socially determined aspirations, which points toward social factors as candidates to diminish harmful aspiration reference dependence. Improving the social environment through friendships and social capital or social cohesion is one contender.

A recent literature on social capital and social cohesion shows that it can help the performance of disadvantaged children (Alan et al., 2021a), improve students perception of their environment (Alan et al., 2021b), and that for people with a low SES, friendships with people from a higher SES is an important predictor of income mobility (Chetty et al., 2022). Moreover, we keep our model simple to focus the intuition, but it could be that students do not know their true capacity and have formed beliefs that correlate with their family income. They would then update their beliefs such as in Kiessling and Norris (2022). In this case, factors that helped students believe they are nearer or further from the reference point – potentially via social cohesion in schools – would then either mitigate or exasperate the consequences of inequality. Using friendship nominations, we show in Section 5 that social integration through friendships moderates the effects from the share of low-income peers on university completion. This holds for both low and high-income students. Programs to improve social capital and social cohesion in schools may then have an important role in mitigating an aspirations gap from inequality.

**Related literature.** Our study relates to a literature on the consequences of inequality for skill development. Much of this literature has focused on how environments during early life affect skill development (for a review see Heckman and Mosso, 2014) and how inequality leads to different incentives for skill investments across low and high SES families (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017; Doepke et al., 2019). Additionally, neighborhood

inequality has long lasting effects on economic mobility (Chetty and Hendren, 2018a), and children gaining entrance just on the margin to higher quality middle schools in Mexico have been found to achieve lower conscientiousness scores and to shift aspirations away from academics toward vocational tracks (Fabregas, 2022). We contribute to this literature by highlighting the consequences of unabated inequality within peer groups in schools. Furthermore, our results offer an additional explanation for why the benefits of moving to a better quality neighborhood are diminished if a child moves at a later age (Chetty et al., 2016; Chetty and Hendren, 2018b).

Our study further relates to a growing literature on the long-run effects of school environments and peer compositions. These include effects from teacher quality (Chetty et al., 2014; Rothstein, 2017), smaller classes (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Krueger and Whitmore, 2001; Chetty et al., 2011; Angrist et al., 2019), school spending (Jackson et al., 2015), and tracking students by ability (Duflo et al., 2011; Guyon et al., 2012). Related to these, a recent study by Jackson et al. (2022) finds that the benefits of attending an effective high school for disadvantaged students runs through dimensions unrelated to test score value added. Our study can help shed light here, as this fits with our results on social cohesion representing where and when disadvantaged students may not be harmed by aspiration gaps.

We also contribute to a recent literature on the long-run effects of peers. This includes work on disruptive peers (Carrell et al., 2018), working mothers within peer groups (Olivetti et al., 2020), peer gender effects on university major (Anelli and Peri, 2019), peers' parental education (Bifulco et al., 2011, 2014), and the effects of high school ability rank on mental health in adulthood (Kiessling and Norris, 2022). More relatedly, Cattani et al. (2022) find elite peers in Norway to positively affect enrollment in elite schools and externally assessed exams. Our paper examines within school peer inequality in the US context, where inequality can be high, and through a focused specification guided by a theoretical model.<sup>3</sup> The weight put on peers in setting individual aspirations may be more salient in a relatively unequal context, where students can be placed much further away from their reference point than in a more equal setting. Thus, context can matter, implying estimates in the peer effects literature cannot be seen as one-size fits all. Our results on social cohesion offer some additional evidence to this point, showing that it can mitigate the detrimental effects we find further emphasizing that context can shape peer mechanisms.

We also relate to a broad range of studies on peer effects. A non-comprehensive summary of these studies include the link between peers' persistence and academic achievement (Golsteyn et al., 2021), exposure to low-achieving peers in Kindergarten

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<sup>3</sup>Higher prevalence and salience of inequality in the US is particularly true when compared to countries such as Norway where the ratio between the top and bottom decile of the disposable income distribution is twice as big in the US than in Norway (6.3 vs 3.1, OECD 2018).

(Bietenbeck, 2020), spillovers in educational attitudes among friends (Gagete-Miranda, 2020; Norris, 2020), and the affects of peer gender compositions (Lavy and Schlosser, 2011; Black et al., 2013; Gong et al., 2021; Borbely et al., forthcoming). Our focus is distinct and demonstrates that peer inequality can have important and very different effects across the distribution of students' family income.

## 2 A Model of Aspirations and Student Effort

We develop a theoretical model of students' effort choice towards the achievement of an educational outcome, and consider the effect that aspirations and peers' capacity can have on this choice. Hence we adopt the approach of modelling aspirations as being socially determined, and derive predictions on how changes in the composition of peers' capacity can affect students' educational attainment through this channel.

### 2.1 Preferences

Students are endowed with initial capacity  $\theta$  and are assumed to be heterogeneous on this dimension. We define capacity as the combined set of factors that enable a student to translate effort into outcomes. Later we will empirically interpret family income as a measure that captures many of these dimensions, which implies that the distribution of capacity a student faces in school captures within school income inequality. Now, we formalize our theory.

Students choose effort  $e$  to achieve an educational outcome  $y$ , realized attainment, given by  $y = y(e, \theta) = \theta e$ . Further, each student has an individual aspiration level  $a$  over the educational outcome  $y$ . We define this aspiration level  $a$  as the aim or goal a student forms for their outcome. We assume students' preferences to be characterized by the following additively separable utility function:

$$u(e, y, a) = b(y) - c(e) + \mu(y - a), \quad (1)$$


where  $b(y) = y^\alpha$ ,  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ , captures the benefit from achieving the outcome  $y$ ;  $c(e) = \phi e^2/2$ ,  $\phi > 0$ , is the cost of effort; and  $\mu(y - a)$  captures the effect of aspirations over outcomes on a student's utility. We assume  $\mu$  to be a reference-dependent gain-loss function, such that  $\mu''(y - a) < 0$  if  $y > a$  (i.e. concavity over gains) and  $\mu''(y - a) > 0$  if  $y < a$  (i.e. convexity over losses):

$$\mu(y - a) = \begin{cases} [y - a]^\beta & \text{if } y \geq a \\ -[a - y]^\beta & \text{if } y < a; \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

where  $\beta \in (0, 1)$ .<sup>4</sup> The properties of  $\mu$  imply that whenever a student exceeds their aspirations,  $y > a$ , they perceive additional satisfaction from achieving  $y$ , which positively affects utility; and whenever a student falls short of their aspirations,  $y < a$ , they instead perceive a sense of frustration, which negatively affects utility.

Figure 1 plots  $\mu$  as a function of the ‘aspirations gap’  $y - a$ , and shows the effect of an increase in the aspiration level. From an initial situation in which aspirations are exceeded

**Figure 1.** Reference Dependence and Aspirations



$y - a > 0$  (the student is in the gain domain), an increase in aspirations increases the marginal benefit of an additional unit of effort (the slope of  $\mu$  becomes steeper), and increasing effort will increase utility. Instead, whenever  $y - a < 0$  (the student perceives this as being a loss), an increase in aspirations would decrease the marginal benefit of an additional unit of effort (the slope of  $\mu$  becomes flatter), implying that decreasing effort will increase utility: as the aspirations gap widens, higher frustration dampens the incentive to exert effort.

## 2.2 Aspirations and students’ effort

In this section we formally characterize how aspirations affect a student’s choice of effort.

<sup>4</sup>This formulation is in the spirit of Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Tversky and Kahneman (1991) value function under riskless choice. In particular, our function  $\mu$  displays both “reference dependence” and “diminishing sensitivity”, but it does not feature “loss aversion”. Note that while both reference dependence and diminishing sensitivity are crucial ingredients of our model, the consideration of loss aversion—despite adding one additional parameter and layer of complexity—would not affect the qualitative predictions of our theory. Moreover, while there is ample evidence of the existence of loss aversion in the evaluation of monetary/material payoffs, less is known about its role in less tangible domains such as that of aspirations.



Consider a student endowed with capacity  $\theta$  and with aspiration  $a$ , that needs to choose effort  $e$  to maximize their utility as given by (1). The first-order conditions characterizing this maximization problem are given by:

$$\alpha[\theta e]^{\alpha-1}\theta + \beta[\theta e - a]^{\beta-1}\theta = \phi e \quad \text{if } y > a, \quad (3)$$

$$\alpha[\theta e]^{\alpha-1}\theta + \beta[a - \theta e]^{\beta-1}\theta = \phi e \quad \text{if } y < a, \quad (4)$$

where the left-hand side captures the marginal benefit of exerting effort, while the right-hand side is the marginal cost. The solution, denoted by  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)$ , is the level of effort at which these are equal.<sup>5</sup> Because the marginal benefit of effort crucially depends on the aspirations gap  $y - a$ , the properties of  $\tilde{e}$  might differ depending on whether aspirations are frustrated,  $y < a$ , or exceeded,  $y > a$ .

To see this, consider a student with sufficiently low aspirations so that, for a given  $\theta$ , aspirations are exceeded  $y > a$  at the optimal effort  $\tilde{e}$ . Denote the optimal effort in this case as  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$ , which is the solution to (3). To understand how aspirations can affect behavior in this case, suppose that this student's aspiration will increase. For example, they may increase when the student is in a better environment for education. As aspirations increase, the marginal benefit of increasing effort is higher, implying that the student will exert more effort. However, effort is increasing costly, and the marginal benefit of achieving better outcomes decreases, implying that once aspirations are beyond an aspiration threshold  $a^*$ , utility is maximized by the solution to (4), which we denote as  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-$ . Aspirations here become frustrated, and the aspirations gap becomes negative. Moreover, as aspirations increase further, the marginal benefit of putting in more effort is now lower, implying that the student will begin to exert less effort.

These considerations lead to the following proposition.

**Proposition 1.** *For given  $\theta$ , there exists a unique aspiration level  $a^*$  such that: if  $a < a^*$ , aspirations are exceeded, that is  $y(\tilde{e}^+, \theta) > a$ ; if  $a > a^*$ , aspirations are frustrated, that is  $y(\tilde{e}^-, \theta) < a$ . Further, for  $a < a^*$ , optimal effort  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)$  is increasing in  $a$ , but for  $a > a^*$ , optimal effort is decreasing in  $a$ . Therefore, the outcome  $y(\tilde{e}, \theta)$  is maximised with respect to  $a$  when  $a = a^*$ .*

Proposition 1 formally establishes that a student's behavior, in terms of effort, depends on their aspiration level in relation to some threshold  $a^*$ . When aspirations are exceeded, an increase in aspirations will foster an increase in effort. However, there is an aspirations level beyond which aspirations become frustrated and the student begins to lose motivation to exert effort. As aspirations increase further, effort decreases, widening the negative aspirations gap and increasing the frustration. Since effort is increasing in


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<sup>5</sup>Our assumptions over  $\mu$  imply that there may be at most two solutions when  $y < a$ . To proceed, we only consider the one according to which a student's effort is increasing in marginal cost. See Appendix A for more details.

aspirations for all  $a < a^*$  and decreasing in aspirations for all  $a > a^*$ , it follows that effort, and the achieved educational outcome  $y$ , are maximized when  $a = a^*$ .

The relationship between student's effort and aspirations, for a given  $\theta$ , is plotted in Figure 2. Notice that since students are heterogeneous in  $\theta$ , there exists a distribution of

**Figure 2.** Optimal Effort and Aspirations



$a^*$ : each student has a different aspirations threshold, depending on their capacity.

### 2.3 Socially determined aspirations

We want to examine the effect of peers on individual students' aspirations and educational outcomes. To do so, we focus on a model of aspirations formation which explicitly considers the influence of a student's social environment on aspirations (in the spirit of Genicot and Ray (2017)), and abstract from determinants of aspirations that are internal to the individual (as formally analyzed in Dalton et al. (2016)). Denote the distribution of capacities that characterizes an individual student's social environment or network by  $F^\theta$ . We assume that aspirations are a continuous and non-decreasing function of a student's capacity  $\theta$  and of the capacity distribution  $F^\theta$ . In particular, we consider the following functional form:

$$a = a(\theta, F^\theta) = \gamma\theta + [1 - \gamma]\mathbb{E}\theta, \quad (5)$$

which implies that aspirations are a weighted average of  $\theta$  and the mean of  $F^\theta$ , denoted by  $\mathbb{E}\theta \equiv \int \theta dF^\theta(\theta)$ .<sup>6</sup> Hence, i) an increase in a student's capacity increases aspirations; and ii) for a given individual  $\theta$ , a student surrounded by peers with higher capacities

<sup>6</sup>Note, this formulation is in the spirit of the aspiration formation model of Genicot and Ray (2017), and it satisfies all its properties. Crucially, it satisfies both "scale-invariance" and "social monotonicity".

will have higher aspirations than a student surrounded by peers with relatively lower capacities. Within this specific formulation,  $\gamma \in (0, 1)$  captures the relative importance of a student's own capacity *versus* their social environment on the formation of aspirations.

## 2.4 Peer effects through aspirations on students' effort

We now formally establish how changes in the social environment of students will affect their aspirations, and how this, in turn, will affect their choice of effort.

To begin with, consider the following proposition, which recasts the results established so far in terms of a student's capacity endowment to also consider the effect that a student's own capacities have on effort through their aspiration formation as given by (5).

**Proposition 2.** *For a given  $F^\theta$ , there exists a threshold  $\theta^*$  such that, if  $\theta < \theta^*$  then aspirations are frustrated, while if  $\theta > \theta^*$  aspirations are exceeded.*

Proposition 2 states that students with lower capacities are more likely to be in the frustration zone, in which  $y(\tilde{e}^-, \theta) < a$ , than students with higher capacities, for which  $y(\tilde{e}^+, \theta) > a$ . This result bears important implications for the effect of an increase in aspirations on students' behavior and educational outcomes. Setting higher goals and aspirations may be beneficial for students at the highest end of the capacity distribution, but detrimental for students at the lowest end of the capacity distribution.

We can then use the result established in Proposition 2 to classify students in terms of their relative position in the capacity distribution. More precisely, for a given  $h > 0$ , where  $h$  is large enough, we define “low capacity” students as those endowed with  $\theta < \theta^* - h$ , “high capacity” students as those endowed with  $\theta > \theta^* + h$ , and “middle capacity” students as those endowed with  $\theta \in [\theta^* - h, \theta^* + h]$ .

**Proposition 3.** *Consider a shift in the capacity distribution from  $F^\theta$  to  $\hat{F}^\theta$ , where  $\hat{F}^\theta < F^\theta$ , and such that  $a(\theta^* + h, \hat{F}^\theta) < a^*$ . Aspirations will increase across students. Moreover, low capacity students will decrease their effort, high capacity students will increase their effort, while the effect on middle capacity students is ambiguous: those endowed with  $\theta < \theta^*$  will decrease their effort, while those endowed with  $\theta \geq \theta^*$  will increase their effort, as long as  $a(\theta, \hat{F}^\theta) < a^*$ .*

Proposition 3 links the previous observation with one specific way in which aspirations can change by the same amount across students, that is, via an increase in the capacity of all students in a given social environment or network. In such a case, as average capacity increases, low capacity students will lose motivation (the marginal benefit of an additional unit of effort is lower) and decrease effort as the aspirations gap widens. High capacity students will instead gain motivation, and increase their effort. For middle

capacity students the effect of an increase in aspirations is ambiguous, as some of these students will lose motivation and decrease effort, while some others will gain motivation and increase effort. Moreover, among this latter group, there will be a fraction that had aspirations in the proximity of  $a^*$  from below, and for whom an increase in aspirations due to an increase in peers' capacity will push them beyond  $a^*$  and make them switch from satisfaction to frustration.

## 2.5 Empirical predictions

We draw empirical predictions from our theoretical model. First, we think of capacity as an increasing function of family income where importantly income may be a salient feature to children in school and it has direct implications for inequality. This idea is based on the fact that SES is positively related to skill trajectories (Doepke et al., 2019; Falk et al., 2021) and negatively correlated with cognitive load (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Lichand and Mani, 2020; Mani et al., 2013). We further provide supportive empirical evidence linking capacity to income (see section 3.1). We will then proxy low (high) capacity with belonging to the bottom (top) part of the household income distribution. Second, we will formalize the capacity distribution, and the shift thereof students are exposed to, by using the share of peers from low-income families.

Our theory predicts that low-capacity students are more likely to be in the frustration zone, where the aspiration gap is negative, than high-capacity students, for which aspirations are likely to be exceeded and the aspiration gap is positive. Middle-capacity students are likely to experience either frustration or satisfaction. As we link capacity with income, these predictions also apply to the income dimension. Thus, considering an increase in the share of low-income peers, students' aspirations will decrease, and our theory would imply the following:

**Prediction 1.** *For students belonging to the lower end of the household income distribution, an increase in the share of low-income peers would induce a reduction in aspiration gaps and ultimately higher educational attainment.*

**Prediction 2.** *For students belonging to the higher end of the household income distribution, an increase in the share of low-income peers would induce an increase in aspiration gaps and lower educational attainment.*

**Prediction 3.** *For students around the middle of the household income distribution, an increase in the share of low-income peers would induce both decreasing and increasing aspiration gaps, which may on average balance towards a weaker, or null, effect on educational attainment.*

## 3 Data and Empirical Strategy

### 3.1 Data and Variables

We use restricted data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health). Add Health is a longitudinal study representative of middle and high schools in the United States in the mid-1990s. For our analysis, the Add Health dataset has several key features. First, it covers multiple cohorts within schools, which we need for our empirical strategy exploiting variation within schools across cohorts. Second, a representative set of students from each cohort is sampled. Third, students were first interviewed in 1994/95, when the majority of students were between 12 and 18 years old, and followed for five waves until 2016-2018. Fourth, the dataset includes household incomes, allowing us to observe within school inequality. We take as our main peer treatment the share of low-income peers within each student's school-cohort and will compare educational outcomes relative to a student's position in the income distribution.


#### 3.1.1 Linking income and capacity.

Here we provide empirical evidence and discussion to make clear the link between income and our theoretical framing of capacity. Being low-income likely captures a range of factors that may be observable and salient to adolescents, which they may use to draw an inference about their opportunity. As discussed in the introduction, low-income is linked to lower skill trajectories across many dimensions partly due to unequal environments and investments in early life skill development (Doepke et al., 2019; Falk et al., 2021).

In Figure 3a, we use the Add Health Picture Vocabulary Test (PVT) score – taken by all respondents at wave I – as a proxy for cognitive skills and plot the association with household income deciles. Consistent with our assumptions about skill trajectories and income we see that higher-income deciles are linked to higher cognitive skills and low-income deciles to lower cognitive skills. This holds both in the raw data and after conditioning on school fixed effects.

Next, low-income may restrict capacity despite ability through affecting cognitive scarcity. The conditions of poverty put individuals under more uncertainty and greater stress, which can detract attention or diminish cognitive resources harming performance regardless of their raw ability (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Lichand and Mani, 2020; Mani et al., 2013). Further, the behavioral science literature finds that adolescents exposed to multiple stressors are at a greater risk for higher depressive symptoms (Thapar et al., 2012). If conditions of low-income expose a student to more stressors, thereby higher cognitive load, we would then expect these students to have more depressive symptoms which can reduce motivation (De Quidt and Haushofer, 2019). Supportive of

**Figure 3.** PVT Scores, CES-D, and Parents' Monetary Investment by Household Income Deciles



**Notes:** For each household income decile, we report bin scatter plots with a quadratic fit line of PVT scores in panel (a), CES-D scores in panel (b) and parental monetary investment in panel (c). The bin scatter plot in panel (a) presents a quadratic fit line before and after conditioning on school fixed effects. Bin scatter plots in panel (b) and (c) present quadratic fit lines before and after conditioning on PVT scores and school fixed effects.

this assumption, in Figure 3b we see that lower income students tend to score higher on depressive symptoms than do wealthier students using the Center of Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D, Radloff, 1977).<sup>7</sup> Finally, in Figure 3c we see that lower income students receive fewer monetary investments from parents, which connects to opportunity. This pattern holds even after conditioning on school fixed effects and PVT scores, implying they are not simply reflecting ability.

In summary, the overall patterns we find are consistent with our capacity interpretation of income that may shape how exposure to inequality matters. We see family

<sup>7</sup>The CES-D is a often used measure of depression in psychiatric epidemiology. This is a scale measure based on self-reported items that are 1-5 with higher values implying more depressive experiences. AddHealth contains 19 of the 20 items on the full scale for which we follow the literature and collect these into a sum. See Kiessling and Norris (2022) for more description and a lengthy discussion about the CES-D score in AddHealth.

income as a particularly salient feature to adolescents that can capture a wide range of underlying factors. We do not aim to uncover each of these features. Rather, we see income as a salient measure that allows us to broadly capture the non-linear effects of peer inequality which are motivated by our theory.

### 3.1.2 Definition of low-income peers.

Our theory is about shifts in the peer distribution of capacity as shifts in the distribution of peer inequality. Our empirical analogue is a focus on the share of low-income peers to efficiently capture significant changes in peer inequality.<sup>8</sup> We define low-income households at wave I of the survey when students were in grades 7 – 12 and the majority (72%) in grades 9 – 12. We will refer to grades as cohorts. To define low-income households, we first include households below the 1994 poverty threshold for a given family size. Second, we additionally include households who are not below the poverty threshold but who are in the bottom third of the income distribution for each family size.<sup>9</sup> Next, our treatment of interest is then calculated as the leave-one-out share of low-income peers at the school-cohort level. This measure on average returns about a 35% share of low-income peers, and it provides near full support (see Appendix Figure B.1a). Additionally, after the inclusion of school and cohort fixed effects, we still maintain considerable variation to identify our effects of interest (see Appendix Figure B.1b).

Different definitions of this share are feasible, and in later robustness checks, we will consider multiple iterations. However, note there is a trade-off. Restrict on smaller portions of the income distribution and we may focus more directly on the poorest but have too little variation within schools to be efficient. Open up the definition to wider portions of the income distribution and we then likely miss-classify many students. Our definition balances this focusing on a reasonably low portion of the distribution partitioned by family sizes, and it obtains a fair degree of within school variation.

### 3.1.3 Educational outcomes.

As our primary outcome, we focus on whether or not a student has completed at least a university bachelor's degree or higher by wave IV of the survey when respondents are on average 28 years old (range: 24-34).<sup>10</sup> We focus on the long-run educational outcome for our baseline results and through our robustness checks. We then turn to performance in high school. For participants who agreed, Add Health collected their full high school

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<sup>8</sup>Interacting the peer mean with the peer standard deviation of income is another possibility to capture strong changes in the distribution, but this may considerably strain our data, because we need to disaggregate effects across students' own position in the income distribution.

<sup>9</sup>Family sizes of 8 or more people are grouped together.

<sup>10</sup>While there is a wave V, attrition at this wave was much more severe. Our results, though, are very similar if using the wave V sample and education information.

transcript data at wave III. We calculate cumulative GPA excluding courses taken in years prior to the survey year of our treatment. We also construct indicators for whether the student took advanced courses in Math, Science, and English.

### 3.1.4 Sample selection and summary statistics.

Columns (1) - (4) of Appendix Table B.1 present summary statistics of our sample in wave I. We first drop observations with missing household income, missing school and cohort identifiers, missing family size, individuals older than 19 at wave I, and individuals from schools with fewer than 20 students in total and 5 students per cohort (6,433 observations).<sup>11</sup> For this sample, these steps leave us with complete information on the share of low-income peers – our treatment. Next, we drop those missing information on education level at wave IV (3,174 observations), leaving us 11,165 students in our analytic sample. For all other controls, we impute them to either 0 for discrete variables or to the mean for continuous variables and control for corresponding missing indicators in all specifications.

In our analytic sample, 52% are female and they are on average 15.5 years old in wave I. The majority of students are white (59%), about 17% report at least one foreign born parent, 38% of all students come from university-educated households, and students have on average 34% of peers from low-income families. Moreover, the mean university graduation rate by wave IV (collected in 2008) in our sample is 33%, which is similar to the national average of 29.4% at the time of the survey (U.S. Census Bureau, 2022). Moreover, to give a sense of the full sample before dropping observations, we compare means in the Appendix Table B.1 for each variable before and after our sample selection criteria. Though most of the mean differences are statistically significant from zero, we observe relatively small absolute mean differences. We interpret our analytic sample as representative of the full population. Additionally, we provide summary statistics for outcomes that we use in later analyses in the Appendix Table B.2. These include our measures taken from the high school transcript data and measures of self-efficacy, beliefs, and aspirations.

## 3.2 Empirical strategy

We need to surmount two hurdles to identify effects from the share of low-income peers. One, unaccounted for selection into schools will likely bias our estimates. Two, our theory guides our prediction that the peer effect is heterogeneous to own-income. Thus, we need to disaggregate effect estimates for the share of low-income peers over the household

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<sup>11</sup>Family size is important for how we define low-income peers thus we drop those missing family size. The restrictions on school and cohort size are standard in the literature using Add Health for peer effect analysis (see Elsner and Ispording, 2018; Kiessling and Norris, 2022).



income distribution and avoid contamination from any non-linear effects that stem from income. We address these problems through (i) using a within school, across cohort design with school and cohort fixed effects commonly deployed in the peer effects literature (e.g., see Sacerdote, 2014) and (ii) highly flexible controls for own-income.

### 3.2.1 Main specification.

We begin with the following specification:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_{ics} = & SLP_{-ics} \times \sum_{k=1}^{10} \mathbb{1}\{IncDecile = k\} \alpha_k \\
& + \ln(Inc)_{SD_{-ics}} \times \sum_{k=1}^{10} \mathbb{1}\{IncDecile = k\} \beta_k \\
& + f(\ln(Inc_{ics})) + \mathbf{X}'_i \gamma_1 + \mathbf{X}'_{-i} \gamma_2 + \mathbf{X}' SD'_{-i} \gamma_3 + \theta_{ics} + \epsilon_{ics},
\end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

where  $Y_{ics}$  denotes the university graduation of student  $i$  in cohort  $c$  and school  $s$  and  $SLP_{-ics}$  denotes the leave-one-out percentage share of peers from low-income households in cohort  $c$  and school  $s$ .<sup>12</sup> We disaggregate the effect ( $\alpha_k$ ) from the share of low-income peers over deciles of own-household income. If our estimates are causal and driven by our proposed aspirations gap mechanism, then we expect the following: increases in  $SLP_{-ics}$  will (i) have a positive effect for students on the lower end of the income distribution (Prediction 1), (ii) have negative effects for students on the upper end (Prediction 2), and (iii) have a weaker or null effect for students in the middle section (Prediction 3).<sup>13</sup> While we begin by disaggregating our effects over deciles, we will later relax this and make our specification more parsimonious.

We further include as a control the leave-one-out standard deviation of peers logged household income, which we also disaggregate across income deciles, as Tincani (2018) shows that higher order moments of peer distributions can exert separate effects. This variable is indeed correlated with our share measure; however, it is useful, because including it may capture a ranking mechanism if part of the effect from exposure to the peer income distribution stems from rank concerns in ability and income is correlated with ability. In expanded specifications, we will additionally include ability rank disaggregated over the income distribution and later assess a wide range of checks against non-linear peer ability effects. Moreover, this dispersion measure may also capture be-

<sup>12</sup>We focus on university completion as this is a more comprehensive measure of educational attainment encompassing both enrollment and retention.

<sup>13</sup>Recall for those in the middle of the income distribution that they are likely to be spread just around the aspiration reference point and thus this shift generates a positive effect for some and a negative effect for others, leading on a weaker or net null effect.

havioral mechanisms separately from our share effects, if those mechanisms correlate with the peer standard deviation of the income distribution.

Next, and importantly, we flexibly control for non-linear effects from own-income by including a cubic polynomial in logged household income. We then control for a set of exogenous demographics and characteristics in  $\mathbf{X}_i$ .<sup>14</sup> In our preferred specification, we supplement these controls by adding peer leave-one-out means for some of these characteristics ( $\mathbf{X}'_{-i}$ ), as a way to capture other potential mechanisms that may run through peer compositions.<sup>15</sup> We also add peer leave-one-out standard deviations ( $\mathbf{XSD}'_{-i}$ ) for continuous characteristic controls (age and family size) to further capture potential effects from second moments of peer compositions. Finally, to focus on within school, across cohort variation we have school and cohort fixed effects given by  $\theta_{ics} = \mu_c + \delta_s$ . The error term is  $\epsilon_{ics}$ .

We could restrict our data further and estimate our effects on sub-samples of own-income. This would allow all covariates to vary by each sub-sample, but the sample sizes would prevent efficient estimation. Thus, we begin with the analytic sample and in a later robustness check consider sub-sample restrictions.

### 3.2.2 Identifying assumption.

In order to identify the causal effects from the share of low-income peers over the income distribution,  $\alpha_k$ , the share has to be as good as randomly assigned. Our assumption is that we have exogeneity conditional on a rich set of controls and fixed effects, implying that<sup>16</sup>

$$E[\epsilon_{ics} | SLP_{-ics} \times \sum_{k=1}^{10} \mathbb{1}\{IncDecile = k\}, \mathbf{X}'_i, \mathbf{X}'_{-i}, \mathbf{XSD}'_{-i}, \theta_{ics}] = 0. \quad (7)$$

Note that while we begin with the disaggregation across deciles of income, based on results from this we then turn to a more parsimonious specification disaggregating over income groups defined as the bottom two deciles, the middle, and top two deciles. In this case, we replace the by decile interaction with  $SLP_{-ics} \times \sum_{k=1}^3 \mathbb{1}\{IncGroup = k\}$ . In either case, our assumption really rests on two critical components. One, that we adequately

<sup>14</sup>These are gender, age and age squared, indicators for race (Asian, Black, Hispanic, White, Other), an indicator for being the child of an immigrant, the family size, indicators for parents' highest degree (less than high school, high school/GED, some college, college degree, postgraduate degree), and an indicator for being raised in a single parent household.

<sup>15</sup>Note that we exclude peer controls in parental education as these could create collinearity problems with our share of low-income peers. We have included them (indicators for whether parents have completed high school, some college education, or post graduate education) in unreported results and they did not change our baseline result but we believe they over-control.

<sup>16</sup>We could also include  $\ln(Inc)_{SD_{-ics}} \times \sum_{k=1}^{10} \mathbb{1}\{IncDecile = k\}$  in this expectation. We do not show it here to keep things concise. Moreover, in general, we include these controls to capture potential mechanisms other than aspiration gaps that we discussed above, rather than as crucial to identification.

capture the relationship between our outcome and own-income, and two, that we cut any link between determinants of selection into schools and our treatment.

For the first, we use a flexible specification in own-income with a cubic polynomial. However, we can easily test for sensitivity here, and in later checks, we expand this up to a sixth degree polynomial or replace the polynomials with ventile fixed effects. Additionally, our demographic and characteristic controls include multiple measures that likely capture further layers to socio-economic standing.

For the second, selection factors likely correlate with  $SLP_{-ics}$ . We show evidence of this in the Appendix Figure B.2. This is a scatter plot of  $SLP_{-ics}$  against school mean income sorted from low to high among those in the bottom two income deciles (panel (a)), the middle deciles (panel (b)), and the top two deciles (panel (c)). In each case, we see that the raw, uncontrolled correlation is clearly negative. We then show these same scatter plots after removing school fixed effects. Though mechanical, as mean school income is a fixed factor, the plots illustrate our identification strategy showing that with school fixed effects this link is now cut and will also be cut for all other unobserved factors common at the school level. Moreover, we can see that in each segment of the income distribution there remains variation in the residual  $SLP_{-ics}$  that we leverage to identify our effects. Our assumption here implies that parents select into schools based on fixed school factors. We also relax this assumption in some specifications in case parents select schools partly based on school trends, adding these via  $\delta_s \times c$  or in other specifications adding school specific income trends.

### 3.2.3 Further specifications.

We also check whether our treatment effect estimates are merely capturing a relationship between ability and university graduation that would offer an alternative mechanism to our expectations. Moreover, a large literature on ability ranks raises a number of points that we later explore, showing that our results are distinct from these effects (Kießling and Norris, 2022; Murphy and Weinhardt, 2020; Elsner and Isphording, 2018, 2017; Elsner et al., 2021; Delaney and Devereux, 2021; Denning et al., 2021; Pagani et al., 2021; Bertoni and Nisticò, 2019).

We already flexibly control for income and this should capture some of the non-linearities in ability given a positive correlation between the two.<sup>17</sup> In the Appendix, Figure B.3b we show that indeed ability school-cohort rank based on PVT scores has a strong, positive relationship with logged household income; although, once we control for ability (Figure B.3c) this relationship is cut. To then control for ability effects, we first supplement our main specification with flexible polynomials in each respondent's

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<sup>17</sup>As we already show in Figure 3, and repeat in the Appendix Figure B.3a with a scatter plot and line of best fit, there is a clear linear relationship between PVT scores and logged household income.

PVT score. Second, we add both polynomials of PVT scores and PVT school-cohort rank – which we will also disaggregate over income groups – as additional controls. Third, in further checks discussed in Section 4.3, we allow for a range of non-linear peer ability effects and eventually include both income rank and ability rank effects showing that our results are distinct from the mechanisms picked up by non-linear peer ability. Our baseline specification and results on the share of low-income peers are never sensitive to these tests.

We will later implement a series of robustness checks to further check the sensitivity of results. Now, we turn to balance testing to assess the reasonableness of our identification assumptions and then turn to the baseline results.

### 3.2.4 Balancing test.

We present our balance tests in Table 1. Each cell in columns (1) - (4) presents a regression of our treatment variable of interest on each row variable. In each test, we control for a cubic in logged household income and school and cohort fixed effects, as these are crucial to our identification. In columns (2) - (4), we restrict the sample around the bottom 20th, the middle, and the top 20th of own-household income to check that our identification assumption is still reasonable within these important groups. Finally, in columns (5) - (7), we repeat this but using the peer standard deviation of logged household income to show that even our additional peer income controls are reasonably exogenous.

Consistent with quasi-random assignment of peers, we observe that most characteristics are not related to our treatment variables. Only the indicator for whether a student is the first-born child seems to be associated with a higher share of low-income peers. Yet, given the number of tests performed is relatively high and the coefficient is small (amounting to less than one percentile score) we interpret the balancing check as strongly consistent with quasi-random assignment of peers.<sup>18</sup>

## 4 Results

We test the effect from a shift in the share of low-income peers on the probability a student completes a university degree or higher by the wave IV survey. Based on our theory and predictions, we expect students at lower income deciles are more likely to fall into the area where aspirations are frustrated. An increase in the share of low-income

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<sup>18</sup>The significant, positive estimate on first-born does show up both on the average of  $SLP_{ics}$  and on  $SLP_{ics}$  for the top-20 income group. We do not think that this is a concern. First-born children often get better resources (Black et al., 2018), thus if anything, we may have predicted an opposite sign effect here. Again, the magnitudes are small and positive and not persistently significant in columns (2), (5), or (7). Finally, we have confirmed that including or excluding it from our controls does not change our baseline nor mechanism results.

**Table 1.** Balancing test

	$SLP_{-ics}$	$SLP_{-ics} \times B20$	$SLP_{-ics} \times M$	$SLP_{-ics} \times T20$	$\text{Log(Inc)SD} \times B20$	$\text{Log(Inc)SD} \times M$	$\text{Log(Inc)SD} \times T20$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Female	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.005* (0.003)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.009)
White	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.011 (0.009)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.012 (0.010)
College-educated Parents	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.006)
Raised by a Single Parent	0.000 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.009 (0.008)
Birth weight (ounces)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
First-born child	0.003** (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003* (0.002)	0.006** (0.003)	0.001 (0.005)	0.007** (0.003)	0.005 (0.005)
Child of an Immigrant	-0.001 (0.002)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.011)
Household receives food stamps	-0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.013 (0.024)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)	0.013 (0.038)
Household size	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.003)
Function of Log Household Income School and Grade FEs	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes	Yes Yes
Observations	11165	2180	6920	2065	2180	6920	2065

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .  $SLP_{-ics}$  denotes the leave-one-out percentage share of peers from low-income households in cohort  $c$  and school  $s$ . Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Columns (1) use the analytic sample; columns (2)-(4) and columns (5)-(7) split the analytic sample by the bottom 20th percentiles household income, the 30th-70th percentiles, and top 20th percentiles households income.


peers, will diminish frustration, improve effort, and on the margins increase ( $\alpha_k > 0$ ) the probability they continue education and graduate university (Prediction 1). Next, we expect students at higher-income deciles are more likely to fall into the area where aspirations are exceeded. An increase in the share of low-income peers, now decreases their effort and on the margins decrease ( $\alpha_k < 0$ ) the probability they continue education and graduate university (Prediction 2). Finally, we expect students around the middle of the income distribution to fall just around the aspirations reference point leading to weaker or null effects (Prediction 3).

## 4.1 Long-run effects on educational attainment

### 4.1.1 Baseline results

We begin by studying the marginal effects from a student's share of low-income peers at wave I on their probability of completing university by wave IV. The marginal effects ( $\alpha_k$ ) are calculated at each decile from the distribution of own-household income at wave I using our preferred specification, as discussed in Section 3.2. Figure 4 reports the results. Standard errors are clustered at the school level here and in all results to follow. Consistent with our predictions we find positive and significant effects for lower-income students (bottom two deciles), null effects over the middle, and negative and significant effects for higher-income groups (top two deciles).

**Figure 4.** The share of low-income peers and effects on university completion over deciles of own-household income



**Notes:** This figure presents the marginal effects on the probability of completing university by wave IV of the survey from the leave-one-out mean (share) of low-income peers in the same-high school and cohort (wave I). The effects are calculated at each decile from the distribution of own-household income at wave I.

Can we make sense of the sharp cutoffs in effects? Our theory implies that on average we would expect weaker or null effects when students in a particular group (e.g., decile of household income) are generally not very far away from their peers as some will be below and others above the reference point balancing effects (see Proposition 3). To empirically shed light on this, we calculate the gap between the individual logged household income and the school-cohort peer mean of logged household income to give the percentage difference (gap:  $\ln(Inc_{ics}) - \ln(Inc_{-ics})$ ). In the Appendix Figure B.4, we present plots of the interquartile range, median, and mean for this gap over household income deciles. We see that students in the first two deciles are much further behind their peers than better off students. Even students in the third decile are much less far behind than those in the first two deciles. For the top household income deciles, we see that those in the ninth and tenth deciles are consistently much further ahead of their peers. Overall, we think these patterns support our findings in Figure 4 and are consistent with our predictions. Students in the bottom and top two deciles are likely the furthest away from their aspiration reference point – from below and above respectively – and thus our theory would suggest variation in our treatment here will induce stronger responses.

Based on our results we move to a more parsimonious specification. We next group the distribution of own-household income into the bottom 20th, middle, and top 20th.

We then use these groups to disaggregate the effect from the share of low-income peers. In Table 2, we present these results across multiple specifications in columns (1) - (6).

Our results match our predictions and are persistent and stable across specifications. Interpreting our preferred specification (column 2), we find that for the bottom 20th of household income distribution in high school a 100% shift in the share of low-income peers yields a 18 percentage point (pp) increase in the likelihood of holding at least a four year degree by wave IV. For the middle group, we find null effects, and for the top 20th of household income the marginal effect is a 25pp decrease. A 100% shift, however, is unlikely to be realistic. Interpreting these in standard deviation shifts (20%) translates the effect for the bottom 20th into a 3.6pp increase and for the top 20th a 4.1pp decrease.

Our key results are statistically significant and the estimates for the bottom and top 20th groups are significantly different across all specifications. One concern is that multiple hypothesis testing within and across specifications could lead to false rejections of the null (Clarke et al., 2020). To account for this, in the Appendix, Table D.1, we report Romano Wolf p-value adjustments across all specifications based on a block cluster bootstrap around schools. Although we obtain higher p-values, our results remain statistically significant at the 5% level for the bottom 20th group and at the 10% level for the top 20th group.

To give some context to the effect estimates, we compare them to the average probability of having at least a four year degree split across income groups. The overall average in our analytic sample is 33%. For those in the bottom 20th of the household income distribution in high school, this average drops to 15%, while it is 31% for the middle group and 59% for the top 20th group. The effect from the share of low-income peers for the bottom 20th group amounts to a 24% increase from the group mean, whereas the effect within the top 20th group is only about 7%. We also compare these effects to conditional university completion gaps over gender and socioeconomic differences, detailed in the Appendix, Figure B.5.<sup>19</sup> These results are sizeable for low-income students and of similar magnitude to other interventions targeting low-income families and their children. For perspective, the magnitude of our effects is comparable to those of Pell Grants, the largest means-tested financial assistance for post-secondary students in the US (Dynarski, 2003). Effect estimates suggest that an offer of \$1,000 in grant aid increases the probability of high-school students attending university by about 3.6pp (Dynarski, 2003).

Next, in columns (3) - (4), we check our results against the inclusion of flexible controls for own-ability and rank. For own-ability, we include a quartic polynomial in the PVT scores and control for the peer (school-cohort) leave-one-out mean as well as the

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<sup>19</sup>The standardized effect for the bottom 20th group amounts to about half of the gap between females and males, around 40% of the gap between university and non-university parents, and is similar in size to the gap between single and two-parent homes. Comparisons are similar looking at the top 20th group.

**Table 2.** Baseline effects on university completion: Share of low-income peers

	University Graduate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Bottom 20	0.18** (0.07)	0.18** (0.07)	0.16** (0.07)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.09)	0.22** (0.10)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Middle	0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.07)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Top 20	-0.25** (0.11)	-0.25** (0.11)	-0.27** (0.11)	-0.27** (0.11)	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.29** (0.13)
Peer Log(Inc) (SD)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Own-Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
School and Cohort FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peer Effects (means)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peer Effects (SD)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Own-Ability Polynomials	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Ability Rank $\times$ Income Position	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
School-specific Cohort Trends	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
School-specific Income Trends	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean University Graduation	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33
Observations	11,165	11,165	11,165	11,165	11,165	11,165
$R^2$	0.241	0.243	0.263	0.264	0.273	0.253
Difference between B20 and T20	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	0.002

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .  $SLP_{-ics}$  denotes the leave-one-out percentage share of peers from low-income households in cohort  $c$  and school  $s$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Estimates of marginal effects of  $SLP_{-ics}$  are for those in the bottom 20th percentiles household income, in the 30th-70th percentiles, and finally in the top 20th percentiles household income. Peer Log(Inc) (SD) denotes the standard deviations of peer log income. We always include a 3-degree polynomial of log household income in the own characteristics control. Ability rank means the ability rank within school cohorts.

standard deviation in PVT scores (column 3). As we discussed in Section 3, we want to check that our effects are not driven by a rank mechanism. Thus, we next add the PVT school-cohort rank, which is also disaggregated by students' position in the bottom 20th, middle, or top 20th income group (column 4).<sup>20</sup> Our key results on the bottom and top 20th groups remain consistent and significant.

Up until now we have assumed that selection factors are captured by the school fixed effects. Now, we relax this assumption with school-specific trends in columns (5) - (6). First, in column (5), we include the expansive specification from column (4) and allow for a linear trend within schools. This specification relaxes the identification assumption but is the most restrictive on the data. Second, in column (6), we use our preferred specification to be more parsimonious, but allow for there to be school specific trends

<sup>20</sup>In a additional checks against alternative mechanisms (see Section 4.3, we will go even further and allow for a wide range of non-linear peer ability effects and also consider income rank effects.



across our defined income groups. In both cases, we find very similar results to those in our simpler specifications.

Finally, we consider a different outcome by using the natural log of individual income at wave IV. These results are reported in the Appendix Table B.4. We find that the bottom 20th household income group at high school improves on wave IV income in response to an increase in the share of low-income peers. For the top 20th group, we see null effects on wave IV income. Our theory does not necessarily make predictions on income; nevertheless, while we do not see effects on students in the top 20th of parental income, the results on income are suggestive that indeed lower income students benefit both in educational attainment and future income.<sup>21</sup>

Altogether, the results in Figure 4 and Table 2 are consistent with expectations based on our theory. Our results suggest the presence of strong non-linear effects stemming from peer income inequality that have not previously been assessed in the literature. We further examine deeper heterogeneity within each income group across student characteristics using a causal forest (see the Appendix Section G for a detailed description of the method and results). We find that our pattern of results on the effects from the share of low income peers across income groups remains consistent when estimated with a causal forest (see the Appendix Figure G.1a). Additionally, we see that these peer effects within income groups are generally persistent across other student characteristics with some minor variations, which we discuss more closely in the Appendix.

Next, we turn to a series of robustness checks and then to explore mechanisms more closely. Particularly, we look at the impact on shorter-run outcomes to proxy effort (GPA) in Section 4.2.1 and beliefs and aspirations in Section 4.2.2. We also consider a range of possible alternative mechanisms in Section 4.3.

#### 4.1.2 Robustness checks

In this section, we report a series of additional analyses to probe the robustness of our results.

**Definitions for the share of low-income peers.** We define low-income households as those whose household income is either below the 1994 poverty threshold or in the bottom third of the income distribution for a given family size. We then calculate the leave-one-out share of low-income peers at the school-cohort level based on this definition. Yet, other definitions of low-income households are conceivable for assignments of the

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<sup>21</sup>While the top 20th group does not see a corresponding drop in income, as may be expected based on the university completion results, it may be that those from higher parental income backgrounds are better positioned to maintain higher-income regardless of their university completion status. This question is beyond the scope of our paper. Nevertheless, the pattern of results suggests strong effects for the bottom 20th group that are different from the experience of the top 20th group.

share of low-income peers for those students who are in the same school cohort and have the same household income. For instance, we could define low-income households based on (i) the bottom 20th percentiles of the income distribution for a given family size, (ii) below median of the income distribution for a given family size, or (iii) the bottom third of the household income distribution based on school region, school urbanicity, and family size (grouping households whose family size is equal or larger than 5).

Of these, we expect most results to be similar except for the below median definition to introduce measurement error by misclassifying a larger share of students as low-income peers when they are not, implying it should return smaller effects. Moreover, definitions that shrink the size of the low-income peer groupings have another tradeoff in that they reduce the degree of variation available within schools thereby potentially yielding less efficient results. In Appendix Table C.2, we compare results from these different definitions. We find similar effects across definitions except for the below median definition where we find weaker effects, as expected, and some less efficient results where the definitions are more stringent. Importantly, the results – absent the definition by the median – are stable. Generally, our current definition of low-income households seems reasonable to capture the stratification of household income.

**Non-linearity in household income.** In our main specification, we adopt a cubic polynomial in logged household income to take the relation of university graduation and own-income into account. Yet, one might worry that we have not captured all the relevant non-linearity between our outcome and logged household income. In Appendix Table C.3, we therefore examine different polynomials up to a sixth order. We find that our results are highly robust regardless of the degree we control for. Moreover, we include a specification with indicators for each ventile level of the logged household income, which non-parametrically controls for different own-income levels, and find our results remain unchanged.

**Subsample by income groups.** In our main specification, we disaggregate our results by own-household income groups for being in the bottom 20th, the middle, and the top 20th. While we gain efficiency from this specification, we do not allow all covariates to vary by each subsample. In Appendix Table C.4, we examine the consistency of our results by splitting the sample over each of the income groups we use. We start from our baseline specification and then add a quartic own-ability polynomial and the school-cohort ability rank as an additional check. We find that our subsample results for the share of low-income peers are consistent with our main results. While the results slightly lose some efficiency, we find the point estimates are quite stable and robust.

**Placebo tests.** Our identification strategy assumes that the share of low-income peers is as good as randomly assigned conditional on own income and school and cohort fixed effects. One way to test against failures of this assumption is with placebo tests. In Appendix Table C.5, We reproduce our main specification results with an alternative treatment variable and then with an alternative outcome variable. As for the placebo treatment variable, we take the share of low-income peers within the same school but from a different cohort with a 1-year or 2-year time gap. As for the placebo outcome, we use an indicator for ever repeating a grade in the past. This is a pre-treatment placebo outcome. Given our identification assumptions hold, we would not expect a link to past repetition of school grades. For the bottom 20th group of own-household income, both placebo tests yield an expected zero. For the top 20th group, we do find some correlation between the placebo treatment and our university graduation outcome, but this effect disappears once we control for school-specific income trends. As is shown in column (6) of Table 2, our point estimates stay consistent when we control for school-specific income trends. These placebo tests are highly consistent with our identifying assumptions and suggest that our main analysis is unbiased.

**Attrition.** In wave IV, after near 14 years of the treatment in wave I, about 78 % of the baseline sample remains.<sup>22</sup> Appendix Table C.6 shows that attrition patterns do not differ by treatment status across own-household income groups regardless of the school and cohort fixed effects we control for. We further assess the robustness of our results to accounting for attrition in two ways. First, we calculate treatment effects using inverse probability weighting (IPW), where the weights are calculated as the predicted probability of being in the wave IV follow-up sample based on the main specification controls and an additional variable for whether the family was willing to move.<sup>23</sup> Second, we use the wave IV sampling weights provided by Add Health to adjust for non-response in longitudinal models. Our results survive parametric corrections for attrition using either IPW or sampling weights in Wave IV.

## 4.2 Short-run effects in high school

To this point, we have shown a robust heterogeneous effect from the share of low-income peers on educational attainment. In this section we investigate high school period measures that relate to the aspirations-effort relationship established by our theory.

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<sup>22</sup>Note that the baseline sample is defined after our initial set of sample selection criteria but before dropping those missing information on education level at wave IV.

<sup>23</sup>We then replicate our results with IPW weights using the specifications in column (2) and column (6) of Table 2.

### 4.2.1 High school performance

We look at whether high school performance is affected by our hypothesised aspirations gap mechanism. Empirically, we expect a heterogeneous pattern on high school performance as far as it proxies short-run effort. We use high school transcripts collected by Add Health for all participants in the wave III surveys, who agreed, and for whom the transcripts were accessible. To overcome attrition at wave III and from wave III into the transcript sample, Add Health constructed specific non-response weights for the education transcript data, which we use in the following analysis.<sup>24</sup>

We leverage this data in two ways. One, we calculate each person's cumulative GPA from the year of their wave I survey (time of our treatment) to the end of high school.<sup>25</sup> Second, we construct separate indicators for whether someone chose to take an advanced course in math, in science, or in English anywhere from the time of their wave I survey to the end of high school.<sup>26</sup>

In Table 3, we report results on these two measures. In column (1), we begin by using self-reported GPA from the wave I survey. Here we find null effects across income groups, but the pattern is as expected with a positive point estimate for the bottom 20th and a negative estimate for the top 20th group. In column (2), we turn to the transcript cumulative GPA. As the share of low-income peers increases, we find a strong, positive increase in GPA for the bottom 20th group. We also see some positive, but smaller, effect for the middle-income group, which remains consistent with our predictions, as the theoretical effect on students in the middle-income group is ambiguous *a priori*, as reductions in aspiration gaps for some students could slightly outweigh effects from those with an increase in the gap. Finally, we see no effect on the top 20th. Nevertheless, we recognise that this group has on average a higher raw ability level, which may allow them to maintain higher grades even if effectively exerting lower effort.

In columns (3) - (6), we turn to taking advanced courses. Here we find that the bottom 20th income group continues to respond positively to an increase in the share of low-income peers. They are significantly more likely to take advanced math and on science the point estimate is positive and rather large. Also, this group has a significant and positive increase in their likelihood to take more than one advanced subject. The middle group returns null results and the top 20th group has mainly null results with a marginally significant negative effect on taking advanced sciences.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Wave III was collected over 2001 and 2002 with participants in young adulthood aged roughly 18-24.

<sup>25</sup>For example, this means that for someone in 10th grade at the wave I survey we calculate their GPA from 10th-12th, while for someone in 12th at the wave I survey we use only their 12th grade scores.

<sup>26</sup>Core required credits for graduation are set by each state, but advanced courses are often at the choice of the student in an effort to pursue University entrance. For math, this is defined by taking pre-calculus or calculus. For science, it is whether one took advanced science or physics. For English, it is whether one took an honors English class.

<sup>27</sup>We also explore outcomes on self-reported risky behaviors. The evidence on risky behaviors is inefficient, with a clearer suggestion that adolescents from higher income families increase in risky behaviors as

**Table 3.** GPA and Advanced Courses

	GPA		Advanced Courses			
	Self	Transcript	Math	Science	English	More than one
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Bottom 20	0.05 (0.15)	0.81*** (0.25)	0.36*** (0.13)	0.25 (0.16)	0.13 (0.22)	0.47*** (0.17)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Middle	-0.07 (0.13)	0.49** (0.21)	0.08 (0.12)	0.01 (0.14)	0.05 (0.23)	0.14 (0.14)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Top 20	-0.18 (0.17)	0.04 (0.29)	0.10 (0.15)	-0.30* (0.18)	0.23 (0.25)	-0.00 (0.17)
Edu non-response weights	NA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep Var	2.77	2.41	0.40	0.45	0.23	0.59
Observations	11074	7297	7309	7277	5183	7318
$R^2$	0.197	0.278	0.255	0.216	0.259	0.244

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. Column (1) shows the effects of share of low-income peers on self-reported GPA from Wave I In-Home data while column (2) shows the effects on average GPA calculated from the first interviewed year to the end of the high school from Wave III high school transcript data. Column (3) - (6) show the effects of share of low-income peers on the taking rate of advanced courses of Math, Science, English, and if ever took more than one advanced course. We use specific educational sampling weights constructed to adjust for transcript non-response as well as survey non-response in column (2) - (6). We trim our data to our analytic sample as in Table 2.

We also repeat the Romano Wolf p-value adjustment we conducted at the baseline to check that our inference is not driven by multiple hypothesis test bias (see Table D.2 in the appendix). We find that our main results on the bottom 20th group survive this adjustment. Finally, for our analysis here we have restricted the sample to those present in our baseline analysis, meaning we drop those who are missing data for university completion. In the Appendix Table E.1, we also report these same results where we include even those who are not present in the baseline analytic sample. These are generally similar to our results in Table 3 and qualitatively yield similar conclusions.

#### 4.2.2 Motivation, beliefs, and aspirations

Our discussion has been rooted in the consequences that inequality can have on externally manipulating educational reference points around aspirations. A key premise being that the social environment, which is *external* and *exogenous* to the individual, influences students' aspirations. Our aspiration gap mechanism focuses on such a shift in aspirations via exposure to inequality in peer compositions, which in turn can affect effort and long-

the share of low income peers increases, while we see null or negative effects on lower income adolescents. We describe these results in more detail in the Appendix Section E.1.2. Overall, the pattern we observe on these additional results remains consistent with expectations particularly for the wealthier students.

term educational outcomes. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily imply that aspiration and belief updating stops here.

In fact, another possibility is that factors *internal* to the individual, such as effort and realised outcomes, can also influence aspirations. This mechanism is central in the theory of Dalton et al. (2016), according to which aspirations and effort are jointly determined, even if individuals fail to recognise it. Combined with a theory of socially determined aspirations, we can then expect that an exogenous shift in aspirations, affecting effort and short-term outcomes, may subsequently trigger a positive feedback loop *from* effort *to* aspirations. In the context of our study it is then possible that an initial reduction in the aspiration gap for low income students, which results in higher effort and high school performance, may in turn positively affect student’s capacity (or beliefs about it), and ultimately increase aspirations. In what follows, we attempt to investigate this potential feedback loop on a number of measures for students’ motivation, mental health, beliefs, and aspirations, being mindful of the existing endogeneity between effort and these outcomes in the short term. As such, we consider the following results as suggestive.

**Self-efficacy and mental health.** We measure self-efficacy and mental health based on contemporaneous (wave I) measures of self-esteem, relative intelligence (self) rating, and depressive symptoms via the CES-D scale. Table 4 reports how the share of low-income peers affects these measures across students. We find that students in the bottom 20th improve on self-esteem and self-perception, while we continue to find null effects for middle-income students, and some evidence for an increase in depressive symptoms among the top 20th students. These patterns are consistent with a reduction in frustration experienced by the bottom 20th group, as we expected. They are also consistent with higher discouragement among the top 20th students, as behavioral symptoms of depression include a loss of motivation and withdrawal of effort (De Quidt and Haushofer, 2019).

**Beliefs.** We now turn to students’ self-reported beliefs about the likelihood to go to college. We interpret this as a proxy for student’s belief about their capacity to achieve a given educational outcome, in this case going to college. Hence we see this measure reflecting what Guyon and Huillery (2021) define as an “attainable option” for students, i.e. what students believe they are capable of pursuing, which is distinct from their “preferred options” or “aspirations”, i.e. what they would prefer to pursue (Guyon and Huillery, 2021).<sup>28</sup> In light of our theoretical framework, this belief measure would be positively correlated with a student’s perceived returns of effort: higher beliefs about own capacity increase the expected marginal return of each additional unit of effort. In

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<sup>28</sup>See also the discussion in Section 4.4 of Genicot and Ray (2020): expectations capture what an individual realistically expects to achieve, while aspirations reflect what one wishes to achieve.

**Table 4.** Self-efficacy and Mental Health

	Self-Esteem	Intelligent Feeling	CES-D scale
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Bottom 20	1.75** (0.85)	0.34* (0.20)	0.94 (1.44)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Middle	0.98 (0.80)	-0.01 (0.18)	0.74 (1.06)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Top 20	0.15 (1.04)	-0.00 (0.26)	3.11* (1.78)
Mean Dep Var	28.56	3.9	11.02
Observations	11134	11151	11154
$R^2$	0.088	0.111	0.092

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. We show the effects of share of low-income peers on self-efficacy. We include self-esteem, perception of relative intelligence, and CES-D under mental health.

columns (1) - (4) of Table 5 we report results on how an increase in the share of low-income peers affect students' beliefs in wave I. The outcome is a 1-5 scale with higher values meaning strong beliefs, except in columns (3) and (4) where we use a binary outcome for having the strongest belief. In both columns (2) and (4) we control for GPA based on transcript data.<sup>29</sup> In doing so, we attempt to control for the aforementioned positive feedback loop from realised outcomes to behavior, but we are aware of the limitations of this approach due to endogeneity. The estimates are not significant, thus they only provide cautiously suggestive evidence. The pattern, however, matches with our previous findings on self-efficacy, suggesting that low income students may acquire better beliefs as the share of low income peers increases and high income students worse beliefs.

**Aspirations.** Finally, we consider students' desire to go to college as a proxy for aspirations consistent with the Guyon and Huillery (2021) definition mentioned above. As discussed earlier, we recognize that our peer treatment shock (i.e., variation in the share of low income peers) may affect students' aspirations directly, via a change in the social environment, as well as indirectly, via the internal feedback loop from effort to aspirations. These effects may offset each other for students in the bottom 20th group, who experience a reduction in their aspiration gap and an increase in effort, while they would work in the same direction for the high-income students, experiencing an increase

<sup>29</sup>When including GPA from the transcript data we continue to use the transcript non-response weights as we discussed in Table 3.

in the aspiration gap and a decrease in effort. Ideally, we would want to isolate any effort-aspiration feedback loop in order to identify the contribution of how changes in the social environment affect aspirations, but this is difficult without an experimental setting. Thus, we interpret our results without and with a control for GPA as suggestive of a total effect from our peer treatment shock on aspirations. We include transcript GPA in an attempt to control for the effort-aspiration feedback loop and therefore uncover the direct partial effect of our treatment on aspirations.

Results on aspirations are reported in columns (5) - (8) of Table 5. In column (5), we see a significant increase in aspirations for an increase in our peer treatment among the bottom 20th students and to a lesser extent the middle income students. Nevertheless, controlling for GPA in column (6) wipes out this effect.<sup>30</sup> In columns (7) and (8), with a binary high, low aspiration outcome, we see similar evidence. There is a weakly significant decrease in the likelihood of holding high aspirations for the bottom income group. Also, there is a strongly significant, with a larger point estimate, decrease for the top.

If anything, these results suggest that aspirations decrease in response to our peer treatment and particularly so for the highest income group. This matches our expectations above of a weaker (negative) effect for the low income group, and a more pronounced negative effect for the high income group. Our estimates are inefficient, but the overall pattern remains consistent with a direct negative effect from an increase in the share of low-income peers on students' aspirations, which is the central premise underlying our theoretical predictions.

To sum up, we find that students in the bottom 20th of the income distribution improve in their self-efficacy and have a suggestively negative effect on aspirations once controlling for GPA. For the top income group, estimates are somewhat weaker overall but still in line with our expectations. We recognise that our measure of aspirations is not perfect and likely contains significant measurement error (see also the discussion around the problem of identifying aspirations in Genicot and Ray (2020)). For these reasons, we remain cautious in our interpretation of the results reported in this section, and despite being persuaded, do not draw definitive conclusions.

### 4.3 Further analysis: alternative mechanisms

In this section we explore evidence on other potential mechanisms that could interact with our peer treatment. Thus far we have found empirical patterns that are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical framework based on socially determined aspirations gaps. Nevertheless, the increase in the share of low-income peers that we leverage as a treatment could also trigger other potential mechanisms and responses from students,

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<sup>30</sup>In unreported results, we confirmed that the results in columns (6) and (8) of Table 5 are not simply due to the smaller sample size when using the transcript GPA.



**Table 5.** Beliefs and Aspirations

	How likely believe will go to college				Desire to go to College			
	Belief Scale (1-5)		High Belief (0,1)		Aspiration Scale (1-5)		High Aspiration (0,1)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Bottom 20	0.36 (0.22)	0.17 (0.34)	0.11 (0.09)	0.05 (0.16)	0.40** (0.18)	-0.15 (0.23)	0.08 (0.09)	-0.22* (0.12)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Middle	0.13 (0.20)	-0.02 (0.32)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.14)	0.28* (0.16)	-0.11 (0.25)	0.06 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.12)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Top 20	-0.05 (0.23)	-0.28 (0.35)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.19)	-0.08 (0.20)	-0.62* (0.36)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.46*** (0.17)
Transcript GPA		0.30*** (0.03)		0.12*** (0.01)		0.21*** (0.03)		0.09*** (0.01)
Mean Dep Var	4.19	4.25	.56	.57	4.46	4.52	.71	.74
Observations	11134	5734	11134	5734	11142	5738	11142	5738
$R^2$	0.168	0.251	0.164	0.221	0.107	0.161	0.092	0.143

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. In columns (1) - (2) the outcome is a 1-5 scale with higher values representing that the student believes it is more likely that they will attend college, while in columns (3) - (4) we use a binary outcome equal to 1 if a student reports the highest belief. In columns (5) - (6) the outcome is a 1-5 scale with higher values representing a stronger desire (aspiration) to attend college, while in columns (7) - (8) we use a binary outcome equal to 1 for students with the strongest desire (aspiration). All outcomes in this table are drawn from the wave I survey.

teachers and parents that we have thus far omitted. To address this, in what follows we begin by explicitly investigating the presence of non-linear peer ability and rank effects. Next, we turn to the possible response of teachers to changes in classroom composition, as well as the potential negative effect of an increase in disruptive behavior. Finally, we also control for the possibility of a parental response to perceived changes in school quality.

**Non-linearity in peer ability.** One possibility is that our results could be simply explained by non-linear effects from the peer ability composition (Booij et al., 2017; Feld and Zölitz, 2017).<sup>31</sup> In the Appendix Table C.1, we control for nonlinear peer ability effects and explore this more closely. We begin, in column (2), by adding to our preferred specification peer mean ability – based on PVT scores – and the standard deviation of peer ability interacted with own-income positions. Next, in column (3), we introduce peer ability heterogeneity around own-ability by adding interaction terms of peer mean ability, peer SD ability, and own-ability. Going further, in columns (4) - (5), we consider interactions of quartiles of a school’s position in the school mean ability distribution and

<sup>31</sup>This literature suggests that nonlinear peer ability effects may be driven by changes in teaching practice that are more or less conducive to different ability groups, or by other factors more directly related to peer interactions.

likewise for the school's position in the SD ability distribution.<sup>32</sup> Across all of these specifications our estimates on the share of low-income peers remain remarkably consistent with our baseline estimates.

Finally, we consider whether our results are explained by rank effects and thereby social comparisons that may not be due to aspiration gaps. While we have already flexibly allowed for ability rank effects in Table 2, we re-consider ranking concerns by allowing for both ability and income rank effects disaggregated across the income distribution. As is shown in columns (6) - (7) of the Appendix Table C.1, our results are not sensitive to ability nor income rank effects. Thus, we conclude that our main results on the share of low-income peers are distinct from, and insensitive to, both non-linear peer ability and rank effects.

**Teachers.** Another possible mechanism operating via non-linearity in peer capacity is teachers' response to changes in the share of low-income peers. The literature on peer effects in education shows that teachers do change their behavior in response to classroom composition aimed at more effectively meeting students' needs (Duflo et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2014; Jackson, 2016; Aucejo et al., 2022; Papageorge et al., 2020). In this case, a possibility is that as the share of low-income peers increases in a given school cohort, teachers may decide to devote more attention to them and also adapt their expectations and teaching practices accordingly. This will benefit low-income students, providing an alternative explanation of our evidence on the bottom-20 students. However, the impact on middle or high-income students is somewhat ambiguous, as it will depend on whether the attention shift to low-income students comes at their expense or not. Moreover, predictions here for low-income students are not entirely clear. Alternatively, if teachers hold implicit stereotypes regarding different income groups, this may obstruct their interaction with students (Carlana, 2019; Carlana et al., 2022b).

We now make three points against a teacher mechanism explaining our results. First, we have shown our results are robust to controlling for the peer ability composition. This suggests that teacher response to changes in the ability composition are unlikely to drive our results. Second, in the U.S. educational context, students typically change classrooms during high school due to changing class enrollment. Thereby, we would expect a teacher driven mechanism for our effects to be dominant only if all, or the significant share, of the teachers in the same school-cohort update their behavior at the same time. Third, if the effects from the share of low-income peers are, at least in part, driven by teachers, empirically we would expect to observe a significant effect on teacher-student interactions. We focus on four items that relate to these interactions from the student self-reported questionnaire at wave I: whether teachers care about

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<sup>32</sup>This is motivated by suggestions in Denning et al. (2021) aimed at capturing more effectively potential non-linear effects from reactions to the distribution of ability in the school.

students, whether students have trouble getting along with teachers, whether teachers treat students fairly, and a mean scale of the above three items. Higher scores in these outcomes reflect better teacher-student interactions. As shown in the Appendix Table E.4, we find null effects on teacher-student interactions. We conclude that teacher attributes and behaviors are unlikely to drive our effects from the share of low-income peers on educational attainment.

**Disruptive peers.** Another possibility is that an increase in the share of low-income peers also picks up some shift in disruptive behavior, which has been shown to cause harm to academic achievement both in the short and in the long run (Carrell and Hoekstra, 2010; Carrell et al., 2018; Kristoffersen et al., 2015; Zhao and Zhao, 2021; Billings and Hoekstra, 2023). Then, we might expect a negative effect of our peer treatment on educational attainment at each point of the income distribution (see evidence in Carrell and Hoekstra (2010); Carrell et al. (2018)).<sup>33</sup> Yet, in light of our baseline results, predictions based on the effect of an increase in disruptive behavior would only be able to explain our negative estimate on high-income students. If disruptive behavior is concurrent with our proposed mechanism based on aspirations, then we might expect these two to offset each other for the case of low-income students and to reinforce each other for the case of high-income students.

To assess this, we repeat our baseline regressions after controlling for disruptive behavior using a number of proxies. Our first measure is the share of peers who score above the median on a delinquency scale.<sup>34</sup> Our second measure is the share of peers who reported getting into a fight at school, and our third measure is the share of peers facing home disruption.<sup>35</sup> In all cases, we disaggregate the peer effect by a student's own-position in the income distribution. As reported in Appendix Table E.5 we find highly consistent estimates for the share of low-income peers across the income distribution regardless of the peer disruption measure we control for, suggesting our baseline treatment effects are not driven by changes in disruptive behavior. We reiterate here that our flexible income controls and our disaggregation over income of the peer dispersion

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<sup>33</sup>Carrell and Hoekstra (2010), and Carrell et al. (2018) are the only two studies we are aware of evaluating the effects of disruptive peers on student outcomes across the income distribution. Carrell et al. (2018) is the only study examining long-term student outcomes, such as university attendance or attainment of any degree. Their findings point to disruptive peers bringing about negative effects on both low- and high-income students. Carrell and Hoekstra (2010) confirms similar results on test scores in the short-run, though results are imprecisely estimated for the low-income group.

<sup>34</sup>Add Health dedicates a sub-section of the survey to self-reported delinquency where respondents filled out their answers privately through an audio computer assisted program. The scale is the sum of the delinquency items. We list each of these with their summary statistics in the Appendix Table B.3.

<sup>35</sup>Home disruption is defined based on the parent survey, typically filled out by the mother, and is equal to one if the parent answered as having binged more than five alcoholic drinks in the last month, reports discussing separation with their partner, or reported frequently arguing with their partner.

(SD) of logged household income may already have picked up a mechanism via peers' disruptive behavior and our results here are consistent with this interpretation.

**Parental Inputs.** A final concurrent mechanism that we consider is parental response to changes in the share of low income peers. Recent evidence in fact points to substitution effects between parental beliefs about school quality and parental time investments (Greaves et al., 2023). If parents can observe their child's peers and infer the distribution of peer quality (through peer income), they may react adjusting their inputs or parenting style.<sup>36</sup> If peer quality is viewed by parents as a signal of school quality, parental response could in part compensate, or even dominate, the negative effect of a decrease in school quality (due to a higher share of low-income peers).<sup>37</sup>

To control for this potential confounding factor, we leverage three different measures of parental involvement from our survey : whether the child had (a) talked about their school work or grades, (b) worked on a project for school, and (c) talked about things they were doing in school with their parents. Then, we construct a school-related involvement scale and use it as an outcome in our baseline regression. We also build a measure of overall involvement, given by a composite scale of ten items including several activities such as going shopping and playing a sport. Results of this exercise are reported in the Appendix Table E.6, where we see no response of parental involvement to variation in the share of low income peers across all different outcomes, suggesting that our peer treatment does not trigger any sort of parental response that could confound our baseline estimates.

## 5 Moderation: Social Cohesion and Capital

### 5.1 Motivation

We finally turn to our third contribution. In this section, we go beyond the theoretical framework presented in Section 2, and we ask what can be done to avoid harmful effects from inequality in peer groups? Our results around capacity linked with income suggest it would be difficult to track on all the important dimensions that could create this inequality. Rather, maybe we can dampen these effects. We explore social integration or cohesion as one potential route to achieve this.

We suggest two competing hypotheses around social integration at school. One, is that it dampens reference dependent aspiration gaps. For instance, Alan et al. (2021a)

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<sup>36</sup>Recent literature examines how parental style can directly intervene in children's peer group formation (Agostinelli et al., 2020). However, we abstract from this mechanisms as both our theoretical framework and our identification strategy treat peers as exogenously determined.

<sup>37</sup>Fredriksson et al. (2016) also provide evidence that the response of high-income parents is greater than that of other groups, when there is an increase in class size.

find that in ethnically mixed schools in Turkey an intervention to improve students' understanding of each other improved social cohesion. Moreover, Alan et al. (2021b) find that students who are better connected in their school-class network perceive their social environment in a more positive light. In this case, better social integration mitigates harm from exposure to income inequality. A competing hypothesis is that more interaction within a group may make income inequality more salient and aspiration gaps more severe. In this case, we would expect stronger effects from income inequality when a student is more socially tied into their school.

We now provide some evidence on the idea that social integration may be important. We first use the school friendship network data available in Add Health to assess how our effects change by network centrality. Second, we use an index of the perception students have of their school climate to disaggregate our treatment effects. Third, we compare our baseline effects against redefining the peer reference group on sharing similar characteristics where friendship ties are more likely.


## 5.2 Heterogeneity by network centrality and school climate

**Network centrality.** We use students' Bonacich centrality to test whether social connectedness moderates the effects of income inequality. Bonacich centrality is an index score that takes into account students' direct and indirect friendship links in the school (Bonacich, 1987). This measure may be endogenous. We do show in the Appendix, Table F.7 that centrality and other measures of friendships do not respond to the share of low income peers. Nevertheless, we caution interpretation and take these results as suggestive.

We take a simple approach, splitting our sample by whether a student has an above or below median centrality score. In Figure 5a, we report the effect from a change in the share of low-income peers on university completion using our preferred specification from the baseline but split on the high/low centrality sub-samples. For the bottom 20th and top 20th income groups, the effects appear to be driven by those with low centrality. The coefficients are not significantly different across the high/low splits, but the pattern of results is suggestive that low centrality students respond the strongest to changes in the share of low-income peers. If better social ties improve social cohesion as the literature suggests, then our findings here imply that better social ties can dampen the harm of peer inequality. Next, we turn to an index of school climate.

**School climate.** We first construct the indicator of the self-perceived school climate using the questions from the in-school survey. Our school climate indicator includes responses to the questions (i) "I feel close to people at this school", (ii) "I feel like I am part of this school", (iii) "The students at this school are prejudiced", (iv) "I am happy to

**Figure 5.** University completion: heterogeneity by network centrality and school climate



**Notes:** This figure tests how different high and low network centrality students react to the share of low-income peers where we split the sample by those above or below the median centrality in panel (a). In panel (b) we do the test over high and low school climate. We always include school and cohort fixed effects as in column (2) of Table 2. P-values of differences are presented at the side.

be at this school”, (v) “I feel safe in my school”. We split our sample by whether a student has a self-perceived school climate above or below the median. In Figure 5b, we can see that for the bottom 20th and top 20th income groups, the effects of a change in the share of low-income peers on university completion tend to be driven by those with low school climate. Low school climate is also consistent with low network centrality and continues to point toward social cohesion as a moderator to the effects of peer inequality.

### 5.3 Peer reference groups based on more similar peers

More refined peer groupings may have stronger friendship ties due to homophily. If social integration mitigates harm from peer inequality, then we should expect stronger peer inequality effects at our broader school-cohort level. We baseline peer reference group is based on all students in a given cohort in the same school. We can also more precisely define the peer reference group around students in the same school and cohort who share characteristics. More specifically, we enrich our main specification and add a second share of low-income peers effects calculated (i) within school, cohort, and gender, (ii) within school, cohort, and race, or (iii) within school, cohort, gender, and race.<sup>38</sup>

In the Appendix Figure F.1, we report the results for the bottom and top 20th income groups on university completion as the outcome.<sup>39</sup> The baseline effect, using the

<sup>38</sup>This is a “horse race”, as we include both our baseline peer reference group definition and a more refined grouping in the same regression.

<sup>39</sup>The middle-income group is always included but we omit their results here as those are null effects and to maintain brevity.

same school and cohort peer definition, remains similar across specifications. However, the additional results based on more restricted peer group definitions have small and insignificant effects for both the bottom 20th and top 20th income groups. These results are consistent with social integration, through friendships in more similar peer groupings, diverting attention from income inequality. Together, the evidence around network centrality, school climate, and more refined peer groupings are all consistent with social integration playing a role in dampening harm from exposure to income inequality.

## 6 Conclusion

We examine the role of income inequality within peer compositions in schools on long-run educational attainment. We develop a novel theoretical framework to analyze the effect of peers' capacity on students' effort, and provide evidence about how the long-run effect of within-school inequality on university completion varies depending on the student's position in the household income distribution. Our theory is based on two key ideas: aspirations have a dual nature and affect students' effort in different ways depending on how they are positioned relative to them; and external factors, such as the distribution of income in a student's social environment, are an important determinant of these aspirations in the spirit of Genicot and Ray (2017)'s model of socially determined aspirations.

Students form a reference point for aspirations as a weighted function of their own capacity to turn effort into outcomes and the capacity of their peers. The model produces some clear predictions that we then test in our empirical analysis: as long as students form aspirations based on their peers capacity, then a downward shift in the peer capacity distribution will reduce individual aspirations. However, depending on the position of the student on the capacity distribution, low- and high-capacity students will experience opposite effects from this shift in terms of their aspiration gaps and effort. The former are likely to lie in the area where aspirations are frustrated, therefore a downward shift in the peer capacity distribution will increase their educational attainment by reducing their aspiration gap and increasing their effort. On the contrary, high capacity students likely lie in the area where aspirations are exceeded, therefore the same downward shift will increase their aspiration gaps and in turn reduce their educational attainment.

We test these theoretical predictions by using the share of low-income peers in a student's cohort within school to model the shift in school peer inequality, arguing that income represents a broader and more encompassing measure of capacity. We then examine how peer distributional shifts affect university completion to a different extent across the distribution of students own-household income. In order to identify these

effects, we leverage within school, across cohort variation and additionally flexibly control for students' household income in addition to a rich vector of individual characteristics.

Our results strongly support the theoretical predictions of our model. We find that low-income students benefit from an upward shift in the share of low-income peers, increasing their likelihood of university completion. Middle-income students experience on average null effects, and high-income students experience a reduced likelihood of university completion. These findings are consistent with our theoretical model and robust to a rich battery of robustness checks. Our effects are sizable in magnitude: a 20% increase in the share of low-income peers raises the likelihood of completing university by 3.6pp for the bottom income students and decreases it by 4.1pp for the top income students. We further use proxies of beliefs and aspirations during high school and show that our results are qualitatively consistent with our proposed mechanism when we account for the possible feedback loop from effort to aspirations. We also show that our results are not driven by potential alternative mechanisms that could interact with our peer treatment further corroborating our theory based on socially determined aspiration gaps.

Additionally, we examine whether social capital and cohesion can moderate the consequences of inequality in peer groups. We find evidence consistent with this, suggesting that when students are better integrated into social networks at school inequality effects become less important. This is important for policy as it suggests that aspiration gaps around inequality may be subverted without a need to change the composition of students.

Our study suggests that aspiration gaps from inequality can have important effects on human capital accumulation and in turn generate further inequality across the income distribution. However, these effects may not be destiny. We find that social integration through friendships moderates our effects of low-income peers on university completion. This points to a potential role for policies fostering social cohesion to mitigate the consequences of inequality in peer groups.



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## Appendix: For Online Publication

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- A Mathematical Proofs
  - B Additional Tables and Figures
  - C Robustness Checks
  - D Romano-Wolf p-value Adjustment
  - E Mechanisms: Additional Results
  - F Social Cohesion and Social Capital Additional Results
  - G Heterogeneity via a Causal Forest
-



## A Mathematical Proofs

**Proof of Proposition 1.** To begin with, it is useful to summarize the properties of the functional forms adopted in the model of Section 2, that is,  $b(0) = 0$ ,  $b'(y) > 0$ ,  $b''(y) < 0$ , and  $\lim_{y \rightarrow \infty} b'(y) = 0$ ,  $\lim_{y \rightarrow 0} b'(y) = \infty$ ;  $c(0) = 0$ ,  $c'(e) > 0$ ,  $c''(e) > 0$ , and  $\lim_{e \rightarrow \infty} c'(e) = \infty$ ; and  $\mu(0) = 0$ ,  $\mu'(y - a) > 0$ ,  $\mu''(y - a) < 0$  if  $y > a$  (concavity over gains) and  $\mu''(y - a) > 0$  if  $y < a$  (convexity over losses), and  $\lim_{y \rightarrow a} \mu'(y - a) = \infty$ . All functions are continuous, and twice differentiable, the only exception being  $\mu$  which is not differentiable at  $y = a$ . Next, we proceed by analyzing the properties of the solution for the case in which  $y > a$ , denoted by  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$  and then for the case in which  $y < a$ , denoted by  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-$ .

*Case of  $y > a$ .* By definition,  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$  is the level of effort at which the first-order condition given by (3) is satisfied. Since  $u_{ee} = b''(y)\theta^2 + \mu''(y - a)\theta^2 - c'' < 0$ , where  $\mu''(y - a) < 0$  when  $y > a$ , we conclude that  $u$  is strictly concave in  $e$ . This, together with the fact that as  $e$  gets smaller,  $\lim_{y \rightarrow a} u_e = \infty$  (so that  $y$  approaches  $a$  from above), and as  $e$  gets larger,  $\lim_{e \rightarrow \infty} u_e = -\infty$ , enables us to conclude that  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$  exists, it is strictly positive, and that it is the unique global maximum of  $u$ . Moreover, note that  $u_{ea} = -\mu''(y - a)\theta > 0$ . Hence, implicit differentiation allows us to deduce that  $\tilde{e}_a^+ = -u_{ea}/u_{ee} > 0$ , which implies that  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$  is increasing in  $a$ .

*Case of  $y < a$ .* Here, by definition  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-$  would be the level of effort at which the first-order condition given by (4) is satisfied. However,  $u_{ee} = b''(y)\theta^2 + \mu''(y - a)\theta^2 - c''$ , the sign of which remains ambiguous, since  $\mu''(y - a) > 0$  when  $y < a$ . Hence, we cannot conclude whether  $u$  is concave or convex in  $e$  in the domain of losses. Nevertheless, we know from the properties of  $b$  and  $\mu$  that the marginal benefit of effort have a U-shape form, since  $\lim_{y \rightarrow 0} b' = \infty$  and  $\lim_{y \rightarrow a} \mu' = \infty$ . This imply that we cannot be sure that a solution exists, or that if it does, that it is unique. To proceed, denote with  $\hat{\phi}$  the value of  $c'' = \phi$  at which  $b''(y)\theta^2 + \mu''(y - a)\theta^2 = \phi$ . It follows that if  $\phi < \hat{\phi}$  there is no solution, while if  $\phi \geq \hat{\phi}$  there will be at most two solutions: one at which  $b''(y)\theta^2 + \mu''(y - a)\theta^2 > \phi$  (which implies  $u_{ee} > 0$ ); and one at which  $b''(y)\theta^2 + \mu''(y - a)\theta^2 < \phi$  (which implies  $u_{ee} < 0$ ). The former would imply that  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-$  is increasing in marginal cost, while the latter would imply that  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-$  is decreasing in marginal cost, which is the one we consider. Hence, if  $\phi < \hat{\phi}$  there is no solution in the loss domain, and the student will choose  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$  (which always exists); while if  $\phi \geq \hat{\phi}$  there always exist two local solutions: one such that  $y > a$  and one such that  $y < a$ . In this case, we assume the student will choose the one that yields the higher utility, in line with utility maximization. To prove that  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-$  is decreasing in  $a$  it is then sufficient to show that  $u_{ea} = -\mu''(y - a)\theta < 0$ , which follows from the fact that  $\mu''(y - a) > 0$  when  $y < a$ . Hence, implicit differentiation yields  $\tilde{e}_a^- = -u_{ea}/u_{ee} < 0$ .

Next, we prove that  $a^*$  exists and that it is unique. Consider the interval  $[0, \underline{a}]$ , such that aspirations are satisfied when  $a \in [0, \underline{a}]$  and that the optimal solution is  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$ , such that  $u(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+, \theta, a) > u(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-, \theta, a)$ . Application of the envelope theorem allows us to conclude that both  $u(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+, \theta, a)$  and  $u(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-, \theta, a)$  are decreasing in  $a$ , where  $\frac{du(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+, \theta, a)}{da} = -\mu'(y(\tilde{e}^+) - a) = b'(y(\tilde{e}^+)) - c'(\tilde{e}^+)$  and  $\frac{du(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-, \theta, a)}{da} = -\mu'(y(\tilde{e}^-) - a) = b'(y(\tilde{e}^-)) - c'(\tilde{e}^-)$ , after using the first-order conditions. Moreover, since  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+ > \tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-$ , by concavity of  $b$  we know that  $b'(\tilde{e}^+) < b'(\tilde{e}^-)$ , which implies that  $\frac{du(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+, \theta, a)}{da} < \frac{du(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-, \theta, a)}{da}$ . That is, as we increase  $a$ ,  $u(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+, \theta, a)$  decreases faster than  $u(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-, \theta, a)$ . This, together with the fact that  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$  is increasing in  $a$  and  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-$  is decreasing in  $a$ , implies that there exists an  $a > 0$  at which  $u(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+, \theta, a) = u(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-, \theta, a)$  (for which we assume the solution to be given by  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$ ). Denote this aspiration level as  $a^*$  and further note that if  $a > a^*$  then it must be that  $u(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+, \theta, a) < u(\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-, \theta, a)$ , implying that the solution switches from being  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$  to  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-$  and aspirations are frustrated. Next, since  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-$  is decreasing in  $a$  it implies that as we increase  $a$  further beyond  $a^*$  aspirations will remain frustrated. The same logic applies for all  $a \in [0, a^*]$ , since as we increase  $a$ , and  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$  is increasing in  $a$ , aspirations remain satisfied in this range. This implies that  $a^*$  is unique.

To conclude, we prove that output is maximized when  $a = a^*$ . For a given capacity  $\theta$  define the level of effort at which aspirations are attained,  $y = a$ , as  $\bar{e}(\theta, a) \equiv \frac{a}{\theta}$ . Hence, when a student exceeds aspirations,  $y > a$  ( $a < a^*$ ), their optimal effort  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$  is such that  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+ > \bar{e}(\theta, a)$  and when they fall short of aspirations,  $y < a$  ( $a > a^*$ ), their optimal effort is such that  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^- < \bar{e}(\theta, a)$ . This implies that  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+ > \tilde{e}(\theta, a)^-$  at  $a^*$ , and since  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)^+$  is increasing in  $a$  it follows that  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a)$ , and therefore  $y$ , is maximized when  $a = a^*$ . ■

**Proof of Proposition 2.** This proof proceeds in two steps. First we show that the level of effort at which aspirations are attained, defined by  $\bar{e}(\theta, a(\theta, F^\theta)) \equiv \frac{a(\theta, F^\theta)}{\theta}$ , is decreasing in  $\theta$ . Then we prove the existence and uniqueness of  $\theta^*$ .

Consider  $\bar{e}(\theta, a(\theta, F^\theta))$  for a given capacity  $\theta$ , and distribution  $F^\theta$ , and denote by  $F^{\theta, \lambda}$  the distribution of  $\theta$  where all capacities are shifted by a factor  $\lambda > 1$ , such that  $F^{\theta, \lambda}(\lambda\theta) = F^\theta(\theta)$ . It follows that the mean of  $F^{\theta, \lambda}$  is given by  $\lambda \mathbb{E}\theta$ . This implies that  $a(\lambda\theta, F^{\theta, \lambda}) = \gamma\lambda\theta + [1 - \gamma]\lambda\mathbb{E}\theta = \lambda a(\theta, F^\theta)$ . Moreover, for any  $\theta$ , if  $\hat{F}^\theta$  is a distribution that first-order stochastically dominates  $F^\theta$  (strictly), that is  $\hat{F}^\theta < F^\theta$ , it follows that  $\mathbb{E}\hat{\theta} \equiv \int \theta d\hat{F}^\theta(\theta) > \mathbb{E}\theta$ , implying that  $a(\theta, \hat{F}^\theta) > a(\theta, F^\theta)$ . These considerations imply

that, for  $\theta_2 = \lambda\theta_1$ , with  $\lambda > 1$ , then:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{e}(\theta_2, a(\theta_2, F^{\theta})) &= \frac{a(\theta_2, F^{\theta})}{\theta_2} \\ &< \frac{a(\theta_2, \lambda F^{\theta})}{\theta_2} = \frac{a(\lambda\theta_1, \lambda F^{\theta})}{\lambda\theta_1} = \frac{\lambda a(\theta_1, F^{\theta})}{\lambda\theta_1} = \bar{e}(\theta_1, a(\theta_1, F^{\theta})).\end{aligned}$$

Hence  $\bar{e}$  is decreasing in  $\theta$ .

Next, from Proposition 1, we know that when a student exceeds their aspirations,  $a < a^*$  their optimal effort is  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a(\theta, F^{\theta}))^+ > \bar{e}(\theta, a(\theta, F^{\theta}))$ ; and when they fall short of aspirations,  $a > a^*$  their optimal effort is  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a(\theta, F^{\theta}))^- < \bar{e}(\theta, a(\theta, F^{\theta}))$ . Hence, there exists a unique  $\bar{e}^*$  such that for all  $(a, \theta)$  with  $\bar{e}(\theta, a(\theta, F^{\theta})) < \bar{e}^*$  aspirations are exceeded (e.g. if  $a < a^*$  for given  $\theta$ ), and for all  $(a, \theta)$  with  $\bar{e}(\theta, a(\theta, F^{\theta})) > \bar{e}^*$  aspirations are frustrated (e.g. if  $a > a^*$  for given  $\theta$ ). This, along with the fact that  $\bar{e}$  is decreasing in  $\theta$ , can be used to deduce that if aspirations are frustrated for some  $\theta_1 \leq \theta^*$ , so that  $\bar{e}(\theta_1, a(\theta_1, F^{\theta})) > \bar{e}^*$ , then they are also frustrated for all  $\theta < \theta_1$ ; while if aspirations are exceeded for some  $\theta_2 \geq \theta^*$ , so that  $\bar{e}(\theta_2, a(\theta_2, F^{\theta})) < \bar{e}^*$ , then they are also exceeded for all  $\theta > \theta_2$ . ■

**Proof of Proposition 3.** First note that if  $\hat{F}^{\theta} < F^{\theta}$ , then  $a(\theta, \hat{F}^{\theta}) > a(\theta, F^{\theta})$  for any given  $\theta$ , hence, aspirations increase for all students. Next, consider low capacity students, for which  $a > a^*$ . If  $a(\theta, \hat{F}^{\theta}) > a(\theta, F^{\theta})$  then  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a(\theta, \hat{F}^{\theta}))^- < \tilde{e}(\theta, a(\theta, F^{\theta}))^-$ . While aspirations increase, effort decreases. Note, this is true for any  $a(\theta, \hat{F}^{\theta})$  since  $a$  is increasing in  $F^{\theta}$ . Then consider high capacity students, for which  $a < a^*$ . If  $a(\theta, \hat{F}^{\theta}) > a(\theta, F^{\theta})$  then  $\tilde{e}(\theta, a(\theta, \hat{F}^{\theta}))^+ > \tilde{e}(\theta, a(\theta, F^{\theta}))^+$ . Both aspirations and effort increase (and we assumed that  $\hat{F}^{\theta}$  is such that  $a(\theta^* + h, \hat{F}^{\theta}) < a^*$ , that is, aspirations will remain satisfied even to the least capable of the high capacity students—and note that also  $a^*$  is a function of  $\theta$ ). Finally, consider middle capacity students. There is a fraction of these students endowed with  $\theta \in [\theta^* - h, \theta^*)$  for which  $a > a^*$ , which implies they behave the same as low capacity students. However, there is also a fraction of these students endowed with  $\theta \in [\theta^*, \theta^* + h]$  whom will increase their effort only as long as the increase in aspirations is such that  $a(\theta, \hat{F}^{\theta}) < a^*$ , while they will decrease their effort if the increase in aspirations is such that  $a(\theta, \hat{F}^{\theta}) > a^*$ . ■

## B Additional Tables and Figures

**Table B.1.** Summary statistics

	Analytic Sample = 11,165				Full Sample		
	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Mean	Mean diff.	<i>p</i> -value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>A. Outcome and Treatment</i>							
College Graduate in wave IV	0.33	0.47	0	1	0.32	0.01	0.01
Share of Low Income Peers ( <i>SLP<sub>-ics</sub></i> )	0.34	0.20	0	1	0.35	-0.01	0.00
<i>B. Student Characteristics</i>							
Logged Household Income	3.56	0.84	0	7	3.52	0.04	0.00
Female	0.52	0.50	0	1	0.51	0.01	0.00
Age	15.47	1.68	11	19	15.66	-0.19	0.00
Hispanic	0.15	0.35	0	1	0.17	-0.02	0.00
White	0.59	0.49	0	1	0.52	0.07	0.00
Black	0.20	0.40	0	1	0.22	-0.02	0.00
Asian	0.05	0.21	0	1	0.07	-0.02	0.00
Other Races	0.02	0.13	0	1	0.02	0.00	0.08
Family Size	3.79	1.21	2	12	3.77	0.02	0.19
Child of and Immigrant	0.17	0.38	0	1	0.22	-0.05	0.00
Less than HS Parents	0.10	0.30	0	1	0.13	-0.03	0.00
HS or GED Parents	0.29	0.46	0	1	0.30	-0.01	0.16
Some College Parents	0.22	0.42	0	1	0.21	0.01	0.02
College Parents	0.25	0.43	0	1	0.23	0.02	0.00
Postgraduate Parents	0.13	0.34	0	1	0.12	0.01	0.07
Single Parent Household	0.30	0.46	0	1	0.32	-0.02	0.00
Grade 7	0.14	0.35	0	1	0.13	0.01	0.00
Grade 8	0.14	0.35	0	1	0.13	0.01	0.00
Grade 9	0.19	0.39	0	1	0.17	0.02	0.00
Grade 10	0.20	0.40	0	1	0.19	0.01	0.21
Grade 11	0.18	0.38	0	1	0.18	0.00	0.46
Grade 12	0.15	0.35	0	1	0.16	-0.01	0.00

**Notes:** Column (1) - (4) in this table present summary statistics for the sample in wave I of AddHealth after restricting to our analytic sample but before imputing the sample, which has 11, 165 observations left. Column (5) presents the mean of full sample available from the dataset. Each variable has around 20,000 observations in the full sample. Column (6) shows the difference in means and column (7) presents the *p*-values from the mean-comparison tests.

**Table B.2.** Additional summary statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>A. GPA and Advanced Courses Taking</i>				
Self-reported GPA at wave I	2.80	0.77	1	4
Transcript average GPA after treatment	2.44	0.89	0	4
Advanced Math courses taking	0.41	0.49	0	1
Advanced Science courses taking	0.46	0.50	0	1
Advanced English courses taking	0.24	0.43	0	1
Taking more than one advanced courses	0.60	0.49	0	1
<i>B. Self Efficacy</i>				
Self esteem (Kaufman)	28.56	4.14	7	35
Intelligent feelings compared to others	3.90	1.08	1	6
CES-D mental health scale	11.02	7.46	0	54
<i>C. Beliefs and Aspirations</i>				
How likely will go to college	4.19	1.12	1	5
Highest belief that they are likely to go to college	0.56	0.50	0	1
How much wanting to go to college	4.46	1.01	1	5
Strongest desire (aspiration) to go to college	0.71	0.45	0	1
Observations	11165			

**Notes:** This table presents additional summary statistics on GPA and advanced courses taking in Table 3, self efficacy in Table 4, and beliefs and aspirations in Table 5 after restricting to our analytic sample.


**Table B.3.** Delinquency scale summary statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Paint graffiti or signs	0.14	0.49	0	3
Deliberately damage property	0.25	0.60	0	3
Lie to your parents or guardians	0.94	1.05	0	3
Take things from a store without paying	0.40	0.80	0	3
Get into a serious physical fight	0.45	0.77	0	3
Hurt someone badly	0.24	0.59	0	3
Run away from home	0.10	0.38	0	3
Drive a car without permission	0.14	0.48	0	3
Steal something worth more than 50 dollars	0.08	0.38	0	3
Go into a house to steal	0.08	0.37	0	3
Threaten to use a weapon to get something	0.06	0.31	0	3
Sell marijuana or other drugs	0.14	0.54	0	3
Steal something worth less than 50 dollars	0.34	0.77	0	3
Take part in a group fight	0.26	0.60	0	3
Act loud, rowdy, or unruly in a public place	0.73	0.91	0	3
Observations	11125			


**Notes:** This table presents summary statistics for the components of delinquency scale after restricting to our analytic sample.

**Figure B.1.** Variation in share of low-income peers

**(a)** Raw variation




**(b)** Variation post removal of school and cohort fixed effects



**Notes:** This figure presents a histogram of the share of low-income peers in our analytic sample. Panel (a) reports the variations in the sample, and panel (b) reports this variation after removal of school and cohort fixed effects with the sample mean added back to place it on the same scale as panel (a). Vertical lines denote the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles.

**Figure B.2.** Variation between the share of low-income peers and school quality heterogeneous to own income groups conditional on school fixed effects




**Notes:** These figures present the share of low-income peers and its residual after removal of school fixed effects with the sample mean added back to it for the bottom 20th, middle, and top 20th of the household income distribution by schools. Schools are sorted based on the mean logged household income of students from the lowest to the highest.




**Figure B.3.** Associations: PVT scores, rank, and household income


**(a)** PVT and ln(Income)



**(b)** PVT Rank and ln(Income)




**(c)** PVT Rank and ln(Income): Control for PVT




**Notes:** In all panels, we control for school fixed effects so associations are based on within school variation. Panel (a) reports a scatter plot and line of best fit between the residuals of the picture vocabulary test (PVT) scores and logged household income after removing school fixed effects. We add the full mean back to place the plot on the scale of the original variables. Panel (b) reports a bin scatter plot between the percentilized PVT school cohort rank based on the PVT scores and logged household income. Panel (c) reports the same as (b) but we control additionally for students' PVT scores.

Figure B.4



**Notes:** For each household income decile, this figure presents box plots of the interquartile range overlaid with lines for the mean and median.

**Figure B.5.** Associations of covariates with university completion



**Notes:** This figure presents a linear specification for logged household income and other characteristics. The base race in our specification is white, and we control for school and cohort fixed effects.

**Table B.4.** Long-run effects on labour market outcomes

	Wave IV Log Individual Income			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Bottom 20	0.33 (0.25)	0.89*** (0.29)	0.79** (0.38)	0.67* (0.39)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Middle	0.24 (0.15)	0.37* (0.21)	0.33 (0.30)	0.30 (0.19)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Top 20	-0.05 (0.24)	0.06 (0.30)	0.08 (0.37)	0.05 (0.41)
School-specific Cohort Trends	No	No	Yes	No
School-specific Income Trends	No	No	No	Yes
Wave IV Sampling Weight	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Log Income	10.18	10.16	10.16	10.16
Observations	9919	9614	9614	9614
$R^2$	0.115	0.171	0.186	0.197

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. We trim our data to our analytic sample as in Table 2 and use Wave IV log household income as the long-run labor market outcome variable. We use Wave IV sampling weight to adjust the attrition in column (2) - (4). The sample weight was computed by the attrition for selecting schools and adolescents, as well as characteristics related to non-response. We further add school-specific cohort trends in column (3) and school-specific income trends in column (4). The result is consistent once we relax the sample size to the fully available sample in Table E.1.

## C Robustness Checks

Table C.1. Accounting for non-linearity in peer ability

	University Graduate						
	Non-linear peer ability effect					Rank effect	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Bottom 20	0.18** (0.07)	0.18*** (0.07)	0.17** (0.07)	0.17** (0.07)	0.17** (0.07)	0.22*** (0.07)	0.23*** (0.07)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Middle	0.02 (0.07)	0.00 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
$SLP_{-ics} \times$ Top 20	-0.25** (0.11)	-0.28** (0.11)	-0.27** (0.11)	-0.26** (0.11)	-0.26** (0.11)	-0.27** (0.12)	-0.29** (0.12)
Peer Effects (means)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peer Effects (SD)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Own-Ability Polynomials	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Peer Ability (means & SD) $\times$ Income Position	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Peer Ability (means) $\times$ Peer Ability (SD) $\times$ Own-Ability	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
School Ability Quartiles (means) $\times$ Own-Ability	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
School Ability Quartiles (SD) $\times$ Own-Ability	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Income Rank $\times$ Income Position	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Ability Rank $\times$ Income Position	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	11165	11165	11165	11165	11165	11164	11164
$R^2$	0.243	0.263	0.263	0.264	0.264	0.243	0.264

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2, which is presented in column (1) of this table. School ability quartiles (means) are the quartiles of schools based on the school-level peer mean ability. School ability quartiles (SD) denote the quartiles of schools based on the school-level standard deviations of peer ability. Income rank denotes the rank of household income within school cohorts while ability rank denotes the rank of ability within school cohorts.

**Table C.2.** Robustness to different definitions for the share of low-income peers

	$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Bottom 20}$	$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Middle}$	$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Top 20}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Original	0.18** (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.25** (0.11)
Bottom 20th Percentile	0.22*** (0.08)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.32** (0.16)
Below Median	0.13** (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.09)
By School Region and Family Size	0.18*** (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.19* (0.11)

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. The first row shows the results of our original definition of the share of low-income peers. In the second row, we define the share of low-income peers as the share of peers in the bottom 20th percentile of household size for a given family size. In the third row, we define the share of low-income peers as the share of peers below the median of household income for a given family size. In the fourth row, we define the share of low-income peers as share of peers in the bottom 3rd of the household income distribution by school region, school urbanicity, and a family size indicator (whether the family size is larger than 4). Observations are equal to 11,165 as our analytic sample size in each specification.

**Table C.3.** Robustness to non-linearity in household income

	Iterations of LnHHInc Polynomials				Ventiles
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Bottom 20}$	0.18** (0.07)	0.17** (0.07)	0.16** (0.07)	0.16** (0.07)	0.16** (0.07)
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Middle}$	0.01 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Top 20}$	-0.25** (0.11)	-0.25** (0.11)	-0.26** (0.11)	-0.26** (0.11)	-0.26** (0.11)
(LnHHInc) <sup>3</sup>	-0.01*** (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	0.10** (0.05)	0.02 (0.17)	
(LnHHInc) <sup>4</sup>		-0.00** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.00 (0.05)	
(LnHHInc) <sup>5</sup>			0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	
(LnHHInc) <sup>6</sup>				0.00 (0.00)	
H.H. Income Ventiles	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	11165	11165	11165	11165	11165

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. Column (5) includes household income ventiles to control for non-linearity.

**Table C.4.** Subsample analysis

	University Graduate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Bottom 20}$	0.27** (0.14)			0.23* (0.13)		
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Middle}$		-0.03 (0.08)			-0.02 (0.08)	
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Top 20}$			-0.34 (0.21)			-0.39* (0.21)
Own-Ability Polynomials	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
School-Cohort Ability Rank	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2180	6920	2065	2180	6920	2065

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Columns (1) - (3) include all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. Columns (4) - (6) add additional controls as in our specification in column (4) of Table 2.

**Table C.5.** Placebo test

	Placebo treatment		Placebo outcome	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Bottom 20}$	0.08 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.12)
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Middle}$	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Top 20}$	-0.20** (0.09)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.05 (0.09)
School-specific Income Trends	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	11047	11047	11149	11149

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. Columns (1) - (2) estimate the effects of the placebo share of low-income peers on the probability of graduating from university. The placebo share of low-income peers is defined using the share of low-income peers in another cohort within the same school. Columns (3) - (4) estimate the effects of actual share of low-income peers on the placebo outcome, which is an indicator of ever repeated a cohort. Column (2) and column (4) add the school-specific income trends to the baseline specification.

**Table C.6.** Attrition analysis and sampling weights

	Attrited in Wave IV				University Graduate		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	IPW Adjusted	Weighted	(7)
Share of Low Income Peers	-0.05 (0.04)	0.07 (0.06)					
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Bottom 20			-0.08 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.19*** (0.07)	0.23** (0.10)	0.26*** (0.08)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Middle			-0.05 (0.05)	0.08 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Top 20			-0.05 (0.06)	0.10 (0.09)	-0.23** (0.11)	-0.27** (0.13)	-0.26* (0.14)
School and Grade Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
School-specific Income Trends	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Share Attrited	.22	.22	.22	.22	.22	.22	.22
Observations	14339	14339	14339	14339	11115	11115	10818
$R^2$	.026	.049	.027	.05	.24	.25	.27

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. The dependent variable in columns (1) - (4) is an indicator equal to one if an individual has attrited in wave IV and zero otherwise. Estimates of marginal effects are for the share of low-income peers in the bottom 20th of percentile household income, for the 30th-70th percentiles, and finally for the top 20th percentiles household income. In columns (5) - (6), we calculate treatment effects of the share of low-income peers on the probability of graduating from university using inverse probability weighting, where the weights are calculated as the predicted probability of being in wave IV follow-up sample based on the available baseline controls as in column (2) of Table 2. We further add the school-specific income trends to the baseline specification in column (6). We use Wave IV sampling weight designed for estimating single-level models to adjust the attrition in column (7). The sample weight was computed by the attrition for selecting schools and adolescents, as well as characteristics related to non-response.



## D Romano-Wolf p-value Adjustment

**Table D.1.** Romano-Wolf p-value adjustment for university graduation

	University Graduate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>SLP<sub>-ics</sub> × Bottom 20</i>						
Original <i>p</i> -value	0.015	0.012	0.013	0.006	0.004	0.027
Romano-Wolf <i>p</i> -value	0.028	0.026	0.026	0.010	0.010	0.044
<i>SLP<sub>-ics</sub> × Middle</i>						
Original <i>p</i> -value	0.854	0.810	0.922	0.986	0.396	0.783
Romano-Wolf <i>p</i> -value	0.948	0.926	0.948	0.982	0.521	0.926
<i>SLP<sub>-ics</sub> × Top 20</i>						
Original <i>p</i> -value	0.030	0.028	0.017	0.014	0.139	0.028
Romano-Wolf <i>p</i> -value	0.052	0.052	0.028	0.028	0.190	0.052

**Notes:** We use Romano and Wolf’s step-down adjusted p-values to conduct multiple hypothesis testing (Clarke et al., 2020; Romano and Wolf, 2005) across specifications. This table provides p-values after controlling for the family-wise error rate. The specifications match specifications in our baseline Table 2.

**Table D.2.** Romano-Wolf p-value adjustment for GPA and advanced courses

	GPA		Advanced Courses			
	Self	Transcript	Math	Science	English	More than one
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>SLP<sub>-ics</sub> × Bottom 20</i>						
Original <i>p</i> -value	0.719	0.001	0.008	0.130	0.552	0.006
Romano-Wolf <i>p</i> -value	0.998	0.026	0.070	0.535	0.978	0.054
<i>SLP<sub>-ics</sub> × Middle</i>						
Original <i>p</i> -value	0.553	0.018	0.522	0.928	0.821	0.337
Romano-Wolf <i>p</i> -value	0.978	0.122	0.978	1.000	1.000	0.884
<i>SLP<sub>-ics</sub> × Top 20</i>						
Original <i>p</i> -value	0.304	0.891	0.494	0.089	0.356	0.994
Romano-Wolf <i>p</i> -value	0.858	1.000	0.968	0.413	0.892	1.000

**Notes:** We use Romano and Wolf’s step-down adjusted p-values to conduct multiple hypothesis testing (Clarke et al., 2020; Romano and Wolf, 2005) on different outcomes. This table provides p-values after controlling for the family-wise error rate.

## E Mechanisms: Additional Results

### E.1 Short-run effects: additional results

#### E.1.1 Short-run effects: GPA and advanced courses with maximum sample

**Table E.1.** GPA and advanced courses: maximum sample estimates

	GPA		Advanced Courses			
	Self	Transcript	Math	Science	English	More than One
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Bottom 20	-0.02 (0.14)	0.71*** (0.24)	0.40*** (0.12)	0.30** (0.15)	0.07 (0.20)	0.54*** (0.16)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Middle	-0.11 (0.12)	0.57** (0.22)	0.15 (0.11)	0.15 (0.14)	0.01 (0.21)	0.26* (0.14)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Top 20	-0.26* (0.15)	0.01 (0.27)	0.14 (0.13)	-0.16 (0.17)	0.11 (0.23)	0.05 (0.15)
Edu non-response weights	NA	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep Var	2.77	2.41	0.40	0.45	0.23	0.59
Observations	14185	8326	8343	8304	5937	8353
$R^2$	0.197	0.282	0.255	0.214	0.255	0.245

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. Column (1) shows the effects of share of low-income peers on self-reported GPA from Wave I In-Home data while column (2) shows the effects on average GPA calculated from the first interviewed year to the end of the high school from Wave III high school transcript data. Columns (3) - (6) show the effects of share of low-income peers on the taking rate of advanced courses of Math, Science, English, and if ever took more than one advanced course. We use specific educational sampling weights constructed to adjust for transcript non-response as well as survey non-response in columns (2) - (6). We use our fully available sample in this table.

#### E.1.2 Short-run effects: risky behaviors

Effort in school may also be proxied by risky behaviors. Students who work harder at school may be less likely to engage in such behaviors and vice-versa. There is broad evidence that human capital investment reduces risky behavior (Kenkel et al., 2006; Conti et al., 2010; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010), as well as evidence that the stringency of education dampens risky behavior (Hao and Cowan, 2019). This could be explained by time constraints in case of contemporaneous effects as well as expectation effects, if students anticipate the future cost of engaging in risky behavior in terms of reduced return to human capital.

Add Health provides a range of self-reported risky behaviors. We assess our effects of interest on these behaviors in the Appendix Table E.3. We expect these may be measured with a degree of error that could obscure results and caution strong conclusions.

We assess drinking behavior in columns (1) - (3). Frequent drinking is an indicator for an above median report on frequency of drinking in the past year; drinking out is whether one drank without their parents present; and binge drinking is an indicator for having ever binged (5 or more) drinks in a single outing in the past year. Next, in columns (4) - (6), we have the number of days one smoked in the past year (column 4); an indicator for above median marijuana use (column 5); and an indicator for having used hard drugs (column 6). Finally, in column (7), we report a measure for having engaged in unprotected sex.

The results for the share of low-income peers have a generally consistent pattern across outcomes. Qualitatively we see mostly negative point estimates for the bottom 20th group and positive point estimates for the top 20th. Many of these are null effects, though not all, thus we do not want to over-interpret them. Nevertheless, these patterns match expectations given our preceding results.

What is the qualitative explanation? As far as risky behavior inversely proxies effort, then our predictions remain the same as those described for high school performance. Thus, as a shift in peer composition externally manipulates the educational reference point, we would expect more effort for low-income adolescents as the share of low-income peers rises via a decrease in the aspiration gap. This would be consistent with a reduction in risky behavior. Conversely, this external shift in the reference point for high-income adolescents widens their positive aspiration gap potentially leading them to place time into alternative pursuits. This would be consistent with an increase in risky behavior.

**Table E.2.** Risky Behavior Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Frequently drinking	0.17	0.38	0	1
Drinking with people other than family	0.41	0.49	0	1
Ever binge drinking	0.29	0.45	0	1
Standardized smoking days during the past month	-0.00	1.00	-0	3
Frequently using marijuana	0.14	0.34	0	1
Ever using hard drug	0.05	0.22	0	1
Standardized having unprotected sex recently	-0.00	1.00	-0	6
Observations	11165			

This table presents summary statistics for the risky behaviors in Table E.3 after restricting to our analytic sample.

## E.2 Alternative mechanisms

**Table E.3. Risky Behavior Outcomes**

	Frequent Drinking	Drinking Out	Binge Drinking	Smoking	Marijuana	Hard Drug	Unprotected Sex
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Bottom 20	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.35* (0.19)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.12 (0.19)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Middle	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.16)	0.06 (0.05)	0.07** (0.03)	0.34** (0.17)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Top 20	0.05 (0.08)	0.09 (0.10)	0.10 (0.09)	0.29 (0.20)	0.11* (0.06)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.46** (0.22)
Mean Dep Var	.17	.41	.29	0	.14	.05	0
Observations	11092	11101	10100	9502	11011	11021	11162
$R^2$	0.083	0.137	0.139	0.134	0.075	0.039	0.038

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. We trim our data to our analytic sample as in Table 2 and standardize smoking and unprotected sex outcomes to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

**Table E.4. Teachers effects: share of low-income peers**

	Care Teachers	Close Teachers	Fair Teachers	Teacher Scale
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Bottom 20	-0.01 (0.22)	-0.33 (0.20)	-0.06 (0.18)	-0.19 (0.20)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Middle	-0.11 (0.17)	-0.14 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.14 (0.19)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Top 20	0.21 (0.24)	-0.08 (0.21)	0.00 (0.21)	0.05 (0.22)
Observations	11110	11164	11162	11165
$R^2$	0.068	0.074	0.055	0.066

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. Each potential teacher channel variable is standardized.

**Table E.5.** Disruptive peers: share of low-income peers

	University Graduate		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Bottom 20	0.18** (0.07)	0.18** (0.07)	0.17** (0.07)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Middle	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Top 20	-0.24** (0.11)	-0.23** (0.11)	-0.26** (0.11)
Share of High Delinquency Peers $\times$ Bottom 20	0.03 (0.12)		
Share of High Delinquency Peers $\times$ Middle	0.07 (0.10)		
Share of High Delinquency Peers $\times$ Top 20	0.10 (0.13)		
Share of Peers Fighting at School $\times$ Bottom 20		-0.08 (0.09)	
Share of Peers Fighting at School $\times$ Middle		-0.06 (0.07)	
Share of Peers Fighting at School $\times$ Top 20		-0.11 (0.12)	
Share of Peers with Home Disruption $\times$ Bottom 20			0.05 (0.08)
Share of Peers with Home Disruption $\times$ Middle			-0.02 (0.07)
Share of Peers with Home Disruption $\times$ Top 20			0.07 (0.12)
Self Delinquency Scale $\times$ Income Position	Yes	No	No
Self Fighting at School Scale $\times$ Income Position	No	Yes	No
Self Home Disruption $\times$ Income Position	No	No	Yes
Mean Dep Var	0.33	0.33	0.33
Observations	11165	11123	11161
$R^2$	0.251	0.247	0.244

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. Delinquency scale is the sum of 15 items presented in Table B.3. High delinquency is defined as above median children among the delinquency scale distribution. Fighting at school indicator is equal to one if the last physical fight the child had occurred at school. Home disruption is defined based on the parent survey, typically filled out by the mother, and is equal to one if the parent answered as having binged more than five alcoholic drinks in the last month, reports discussing separation with their partner, or reported frequently arguing with their partner.

**Table E.6.** Parental involvement

	School-related Involvement			Overall Involvement
	Mother	Father	Parents	Parents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Bottom 20	-0.06 (0.19)	0.03 (0.24)	-0.10 (0.19)	0.02 (0.19)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Middle	-0.03 (0.16)	-0.18 (0.21)	-0.13 (0.16)	0.02 (0.16)
$SLP_{ics} \times$ Top 20	-0.08 (0.23)	-0.32 (0.26)	-0.18 (0.22)	0.18 (0.22)
Mean Dep Var	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05
Observations	10699	8049	11073	11073
$R^2$	0.052	0.054	0.060	0.103

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. We use three measures: (a) talked about their schoolwork or grades, (b) worked on a project for school, and (c) talked about things they were doing in school to construct the school-related involvement scale for mothers and fathers. Scales for mothers and fathers are averaged to create a parent score. Aggregated involvement in column (4) is a composite scale of ten items including all activities such as going shopping, playing a sport, going to a religious service or church-related event, talking about someone they were dating, going to a movie, talking about a personal problem, and having a serious argument about their behavior. Each scale is standardized.



## F Social cohesion and social capital: additional results

**Table F.7.** Network centrality effects

	Bonacich centrality	In-degree	Male reciprocates	Female reciprocates
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Bottom 20}$	0.17 (0.27)	0.10 (0.24)	0.05 (0.17)	0.07 (0.15)
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Middle}$	-0.05 (0.27)	-0.28 (0.22)	-0.08 (0.14)	0.09 (0.12)
$SLP_{ics} \times \text{Top 20}$	0.22 (0.34)	-0.22 (0.28)	0.06 (0.19)	0.04 (0.17)
Mean Dep Var	0.06	0.06	0.54	0.63
Observations	8,114	8,114	3,705	4,286
$R^2$	0.079	0.120	0.106	0.161

**Notes:** \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . School and cohort fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. Each specification includes all controls as in our preferred baseline specification in column (2) of Table 2. Bonacich centrality and In-degree variables are standardized. Male reciprocates denotes that whether the person ego nominated as his/her best male friend nominated ego a friend.

**Figure F.1.** University completion: different definitions of peers groups



**Notes:** These figures tests how different definitions of peer groups compare against our baseline effects from the share of low-income peers on university graduation. We always include school and cohort fixed effects as in column (2) of Table 2. Panel A presents the estimates for students in the bottom 20th percentile of household income. Panels B presents the estimates for students in the top 20th percentile of household income. In each sub-panel, we include both definitions of the share of low-income peers in the regression. The middle-income students are included in the regression but we omit the estimates here as they are null effects.



## G Heterogeneity via a Causal Forest

We want to examine heterogeneity across subgroups in our data that may be relevant for policy, e.g., by gender, single parent homes, and so forth. However, our main results are already heterogeneous by whether a student is from a low, middle, or higher-income family. Thus, further heterogeneity across many dimensions is difficult. While absent a larger sample there is no way to avoid this problem, we can use the recently developed, and data driven, causal forest approach to gain a better idea around how our effects differ across both observable dimensions in our data and the family income groups we have used throughout the paper.

Causal forests change the problem from estimating differences in effects across specific groups to nonparametrically recovering heterogeneous treatment effects across individuals. This approach, pioneered by Athey and Imbens (2016); Wager and Athey (2018); Athey et al. (2019), adapts regression trees to capture how treatment effects vary across partitions based on feasible combinations of observable control variables. With a binary treatment, this implies estimating differences in potential outcomes at realization of specific values among the observed controls yielding conditional average treatment effects (CATEs). In our case, we recover conditional average partial effects as  $E[Cov[Y_i, W_i]|X_i]/Var[W_i|X_i]$  where  $Y_i$  is university graduation,  $W_i$  is the share of low-income peers, and  $X_i$  is our vector of exogenous individual characteristics. We will refer to these as CATEs for simplicity.

Causal forest works by growing trees. Put simply each tree is a partition of leaves whereby each leaf is a subset of observations with particular realizations of characteristics. Leaves are partitioned by maximizing the variance in treatment effects across partitions tuned with cross validation. In the “honest” implementation of Wager and Athey (2018), each tree is grown by randomly splitting the data into training and estimation subsets, using the training data to grow the tree, i.e., find the partitions, and the estimation sample to make the “out of bag” estimation of the treatment effects within partitions. The out of bag estimates are estimated on each leaf and then aggregated across trees. Importantly, Athey et al. (2019) show that treatment effect estimates under unconfoundness and “honesty” are asymptotically normal, allowing the calculation of confidence intervals.<sup>1</sup>

We employ causal forests but with two pre-step modifications. Note that causal forests rely on unconfoundness either via randomization or through conditioning. Thus, step one: we residualize  $Y$ ,  $W$ , and each of our controls removing school and cohort fixed effects and we do this separately with the bottom 20th, middle, high-income groups. Next, we want to investigate heterogeneity within our already defined low, middle, and high-income groups due to our pre-existing focus on these groups motivated from our theory.

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<sup>1</sup>This discussion omits complexities on tuning parameters discussed in Athey and Imbens (2016); Wager and Athey (2018); Athey et al. (2019).

Thus, step two: we run the causal forest on each of these income groups separately using the residualized variables from step one. Moreover, we employ cluster-robust random forests at the school level as shown in Athey and Wager (2019).<sup>2</sup> Finally, we stack the out of bag CATE estimates across income groups for analysis.

We first demonstrate that the pattern in the CATEs across income groups matches closely to our previous results in panel (a) of Figure G.1. For the bottom 20th income group, the interquartile range falls entirely in the positive domain with a median of 0.234. The middle group falls right around zero. And, finally, the top 20th group has an interquartile range below zero with a median of  $-0.229$ .

Next, in panel (b), we check whether our results vary over cognitive ability. We have already discussed the link between income and ability and we have controlled flexibly for ability and school-cohort ability rank. It could be, however, that only a portion of the ability distribution drives our results. For instance, Carlana et al. (2022a) focus on a treatment applied to higher ability disadvantaged students who at pre-treatment tended to hold lower beliefs about their educational possibilities relative to more advantaged students of the similar ability. It is useful for policy then to understand whether an aspiration gap mechanism centers around certain portions of the ability distribution or is relevant across ability types. We, however, expect that this mechanism is relevant across cognitive ability types, per our arguments that capacity is broader than just cognitive ability, meaning students of different ability types are also faced with other skills and constraints that our mechanism can operate around.

In panel (b) of Figure G.1, we find rather homogeneous effects across the ability distribution (PVT scores) among the bottom 20th and middle-income groups. For the bottom 20th, effects are always positive and quite similar and for the middle-income group the CATEs are near zero and similar across ability. The top 20th group does show some heterogeneity with effects that are always negative but somewhat mitigated at the top end of the ability distribution. While these students may well have a very high capacity, this pattern is suggestive that very high ability students are likely to complete university for many other reasons or they place less weight on the social environment to determine their reference points. This is proxied by  $\gamma$  in our theory. Students with a high family income but who are not in the top of the ability distribution may still have higher capacity due to better opportunities – or alternatively have high beliefs due their family income such that their beliefs are above their true capacity – and may then be the ones who put more weight on the social environment to determine their reference points.

We then report binscatter plots across income deciles split by gender and by dual vs. single parent homes in panel (c) and (d) of Figure G.1. The effects are generally similar across genders but with females experiencing stronger, more positive, effects in the bottom 20th, and somewhat more negative effects in the top 20th. Students from

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<sup>2</sup>To implement, we use the *grf* package and *causal\_forest* command in R.

dual parent homes exhibit a similar pattern, with particularly stronger effects among the top 20th.

Now we turn to evaluate the variation in the CATEs across the set of individual characteristics in Table G.1. Our individual characteristics included in the causal forests correspond to those in the Appendix Table B.1. We split each income group by those with a high or low CATE (above or below the median)<sup>3</sup> and then test mean differences in having a high or low CATE across student characteristics and report a p-value adjusted for multiple hypothesis test bias.

First, the median CATE in each income group matches our expectations and previous results. The median CATE is 0.234 for the bottom 20th,  $-0.002$  for the middle, and  $-0.229$  for the top 20th income group. Second, we see a number of significant differences across high and low median groups in terms of characteristics. Many of these are minimal in magnitude; however, gender and single parent homes stand out.


We find that in the bottom 20th there are significantly more females and more students from dual parent homes with an above median CATE. For the top 20th, we continue to see significant heterogeneity by gender and single parent home status. These differences are significant even after adjusting for multiple hypothesis test bias. Here there is a higher share of females and students from dual parent homes with a below median CATE – as the median here is negative this implies they have a larger magnitude effect in absolute value.

In this case, a reasonable assumption is that adolescents in dual parent homes, and where incomes are high, likely have high capacity through a broader range of opportunities and fewer life stressors. Thus, these students would be farther ahead of their aspiration reference point as the share of low-income peers increases. We cannot, however, make conclusions here and look to these results as suggestive. Possibly a more important takeaway from this exercise is that our results overall are quite consistent across income groups.

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<sup>3</sup>Our approach here is similar to that of Carlana et al. (2022a) except that we split across income groups.

**Figure G.1.** Causal forest heterogeneity in CATEs by income groups



**Table G.1.** Causal forest: heterogeneity in the CATEs by individual characteristics

	Top 20											
	Bottom 20						Middle					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
High Predicted CATE	Low Predicted CATE	Diff.	Romano-Wolf $p$ -value	High Predicted CATE	Low Predicted CATE	Diff.	Romano-Wolf $p$ -value	High Predicted CATE	Low Predicted CATE	Diff.	Romano-Wolf $p$ -value	
Less than HS Parents	0.302	0.388	-0.086	0.130	0.091	0.132	-0.040	0.031	0.038	0.023	0.014	0.264
HS or GED Parents	0.572	0.507	0.064	0.368	0.546	0.547	-0.001	0.986	0.209	0.342	-0.133	0.003
College Parents	0.127	0.105	0.022	0.768	0.363	0.322	0.041	0.063	0.753	0.635	0.118	0.003
Missing Parents' Education	0.076	0.093	-0.017	0.800	0.035	0.043	-0.008	0.520	0.027	0.006	0.021	0.037
Female	0.700	0.395	0.305	0.003	0.525	0.516	0.008	0.920	0.459	0.564	-0.105	0.017
Age	15.298	15.714	-0.416	0.029	15.560	15.322	0.238	0.016	15.444	15.609	-0.165	0.264
Age Squared	236.792	249.677	-12.885	0.029	244.905	237.707	7.198	0.018	241.020	246.604	-5.583	0.209
Hispanic	0.238	0.229	0.008	0.962	0.120	0.169	-0.049	0.018	0.083	0.053	0.030	0.182
Black	0.326	0.362	-0.037	0.721	0.199	0.156	0.043	0.047	0.092	0.165	-0.073	0.017
Asian	0.028	0.021	0.007	0.876	0.057	0.042	0.014	0.135	0.075	0.052	0.022	0.264
Other Races	0.022	0.021	0.001	0.962	0.018	0.015	0.003	0.920	0.010	0.008	0.002	0.875
Missing Races	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.883	0.000	0.003	-0.003	0.090	0.005	0.000	0.005	0.264
Child of an Immigrant	0.228	0.212	0.016	0.895	0.153	0.182	-0.030	0.090	0.138	0.115	0.023	0.270
Missing Child of an Immigrant Info	0.002	0.003	-0.001	0.962	0.001	0.001	-0.000	1.000	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.584
Single Parent Household	0.528	0.707	-0.179	0.003	0.202	0.328	-0.126	0.002	0.187	0.027	0.160	0.003
Family Size	3.928	3.361	0.567	0.003	3.982	3.624	0.358	0.002	3.893	3.907	-0.014	0.875
Ability (AHPVT scores)	96.594	93.130	3.463	0.035	101.719	103.014	-1.295	0.047	108.521	105.925	2.595	0.017
Median CATEs		0.232			0.002					-0.237		
Observations	1090	1090	2180		3460	3460	6920		1033	1032	2065	

**Notes:** We report summary statistics as the mean for each characteristic split by those above or below the median of CATEs in a specific income group. We also report the difference between the means in columns 3, 7, and 11. Columns 4, 8, and 12 show the Romano-Wolf  $p$ -values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing. Note that for the top 20 group an above median (high) CATE would imply values closer to zero and a below median (low) CATE implies values that are more negative. See Figure G.1 for reference.